Category Archives: European Union

EU Youth Mobility Scheme: Brexit divisions and the Burnham factor

GK’s Brett Morton examines the ongoing negotiations with the EU on a youth mobility scheme and what it means for the future of the UK-EU relationship

A youth mobility agreement has become a central component of the Labour government’s drive to improve UK-EU relations. Although both sides broadly support the principle of making it easier for young people to live, work and study across borders, the parties remain divided over the terms. Points of contention over immigration caps and tuition fees risk preventing a wider package of UK-EU cooperation measures. Both sides had been keen to secure these at a second bilateral summit scheduled for 22 July in Brussels. The summit has now been delayed following the Prime Minister’s resignation.

The scheme under discussion would allow 18-30-year-olds from the UK and EU to spend a limited period living, studying and working in each other’s countries. In broad terms, it would resemble the agreement the UK already has with countries such as Australia and Canada. Under those arrangements, young people can come to Britain for up to three years, subject to visa rules and annual caps, and work, travel or study without employer sponsorship. The UK would like any deal with the EU to follow the same basic model: temporary, managed and clearly distinct from free movement.

That distinction matters because immigration remains one of the most politically charged legacies of Brexit. Opponents of the proposal, including Nigel Farage, argue that such a scheme would amount to freedom of movement under a different name. Ministers have been keen to stress that any agreement with the EU would be time-limited and capped. Reports suggest the Starmer government favoured a ceiling of 50,000 participants a year. The EU, by contrast, is believed to prefer a more flexible arrangement, with no fixed cap but a break mechanism that would allow either side to intervene if numbers became excessive. For the next Prime Minister, accepting a scheme without a visible numerical limit would be politically difficult, particularly given the public’s appetite to reduce net migration.

Since Brexit, labour shortages have become a persistent problem in sectors such as hospitality, agriculture and construction. At present, a young EU citizen who wants to work in the UK for a limited period usually needs sponsorship from a British employer. In practice, that system is often costly, bureaucratic and tied to salary thresholds that many small businesses cannot meet. In many cases, sponsorship requires employers to offer a salary of at least £41,700 a year, or the going rate for the role, which places it out of reach for much seasonal, temporary and lower-paid work. Supporters of a youth mobility scheme argue that without the need for sponsorship or salary thresholds, it could widen the pool of labour and make it easier to fill temporary or seasonal vacancies. Even so, its impact would be limited, as it may ease pressure in high-turnover sectors but would do far less to address longer-term shortages in fields that depend on permanent skilled workers, such as healthcare or technology.

A major obstacle to a youth mobility agreement is tuition fees. The EU wants students to study in the UK and EU countries on the same basis as domestic students, meaning EU students at UK universities would pay home fees rather than higher international rates. With 24 institutions reportedly at risk of insolvency within the next year, according to the Education Select Committee, international student fees have become a vital source of income. The Russel Group, an association of 24 prestigious universities in the UK, has warned that granting EU students home fee status could cost the sector around £580 million, reducing universities’ ability to invest in programmes such as Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe.

The youth mobility debate must also be understood in its wider political context. Starmer had originally hoped that a UK-EU reset would help revive his premiership by showing that closer cooperation with Europe could deliver practical benefits, from smoother trade to lower costs for consumers. With his resignation, that personal political purpose has fallen away. Future negotiations are no longer about rescuing his administration, but about shaping the direction of the next Prime Minister’s agenda.

With an Andy Burnham coronation now increasingly likely ahead of 22 July, the EU has postponed the summit. A youth mobility scheme could offer Burnham an opportunity to pursue economic and social reforms in response to what he has described as the ‘damage’ caused by Brexit. However, Burnham is also likely to be cautious about making significant concessions to Brussels, particularly on a cap, as he seeks to appeal to Reform UK voters and avoid reopening divisions from the Brexit referendum ahead of a potential 2029 general election. The future of any youth mobility scheme with the EU will therefore depend on Burnham’s political calculus.

From Policy to Production: The EU’s Industrial Accelerator Act

The journey was long and the debates fierce. While the European Commission had initially scheduled its official presentation for November 25, 2025, it was only on March 4, 2026, that the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) was finally unveiled.

Justified by the imperative of economic security, this initiative marks a major turning point in the Union’s economic strategy. It aims to strengthen supply chain resilience while safeguarding the continent’s industrial capacity.

First mentioned in the Clean Industrial Deal under the name Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act, the text was intended to stimulate demand for clean European products by introducing sustainability, resilience, and European preference criteria into both public and private tenders.

Although the final regulation has dropped the “decarbonisation” label, it retains its core essence. The Commission has set an ambitious sovereignty target: to increase the share of manufacturing industry to 20% of European GDP by 2035.

However, this text is the result of a laborious compromise. In the face of reluctance from certain Member States and internal tensions between several Directorates-General, some flagship measures had to be substantially reworked before reaching this final version.

Streamlining Industrial Procedures

Several measures within the IAA aim to facilitate and strengthen the deployment of industrial manufacturing capacities.

Facilitating Permit-Granting Procedures

This applies specifically to permit-granting procedures for industrial manufacturing and decarbonisation projects. Member States are required to establish a single application procedure, grouping all necessary permits within one application, accessible through a single access point.

A designated competent authority, responsible for coordinating the process, has 45 days to either acknowledge the application as complete or request any missing information. At the same time, all energy-intensive industry decarbonisation projects benefit from preferential treatment: they must be able to rely on the accelerated procedures provided for by the NZIA (Net-Zero Industry Act), as well as the environmental assessment streamlining measures proposed by the Commission in February.

Creation of Industrial Manufacturing Acceleration Areas

The regulation also mandates each Member State to designate industrial manufacturing acceleration areas on its territory.

Designed as true clusters of “industrial symbiosis,” these areas must provide a reinforced competitiveness framework. This includes the streamlining of procedures and the pooling of infrastructure, as well as access to financing, support for research and innovation, and the provision of a skilled workforce.

These areas are intended to prioritize manufacturing sites for sectors identified as strategic, namely:

  • Certain energy-intensive industries: manufacture of paper, coke and refined petroleum products, chemicals, rubber and plastic products, other non-metallic minerals, and basic metals;
  • The automotive industry: manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers;
  • Net-zero technologies identified in the NZIA (notably batteries, solar PV, and hydrogen).

Developing Demand for Clean European Products

One of the primary objectives of the IAA is to foster the emergence of lead markets for certain products in strategic sectors by imposing European origin requirements, low-carbon intensity criteria, or a combination of both.

An Outward-Looking European Preference

Arguably the most sensitive point of the text, the Commission’s proposal outlines, for the first time, the contours of a European preference (outside the field of defense). The IAA thus conditions access to certain public procurement contracts or public support schemes on compliance with a European origin criterion for the products supplied.

Regarding industrial production, only a few specific products are targeted:

  • Concrete and mortar, as well as any product whose performance depends mainly on these materials (including clinker and cement), intended for buildings and infrastructure. The required share of European origin is set at 5%.
  • Aluminium, and products whose performance depends mainly on it, used in buildings, infrastructure, and the automotive sector. The European origin threshold here is 25%.

For the automotive sector, the origin criterion applies only to pure electric vehicles (PEV), off-vehicle charging hybrid electric vehicles (OVC-HEV), and fuel-cell electric vehicles (FCEV) that are purchased, leased, rented or hire-purchased.

To satisfy this criterion, several conditions are set, such as final assembly within the Union, the integration of at least three main specific battery components originating in the EU, or a ratio where the total ex-works price of vehicle components (excluding the battery) originating in the Union represents at least 70% of the total ex-works price of all components. Specific conditions are also provided for small electric vehicles in the new M1E category, introduced during the automotive package of December 2025.

However, far from Chinese-style protectionism or the “Buy American Act,” this European version represents a middle ground between the need for protection expressed by part of European industry and the commitment of certain Member States to international trade.

This balance relies on several limitations, whether in the scope of public procurement and public support schemes affected by this European preference (see Articles 11 and 12), or in the actual location of the production country.

Indeed, Articles 8 and 9 specify that content originating from partner third countries (signatories of a free trade or customs union agreement, or parties to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement) is deemed to be of Union origin.

Introduction of Low-Carbon Content Requirements

The IAA also imposes carbon emission requirements for certain products supplied in the context of public procurement or projects benefiting from public support. These requirements target concrete, mortar, and aluminium under the same conditions as the European origin criterion, but also include steel. Indeed, the proposed regulation stipulates that at least 25% of steel (as well as any product whose performance depends mainly on this material) intended for buildings, infrastructure, and motor vehicles, must meet low-carbon criteria.

The framework for assessing this low-carbon character varies depending on the nature of the products:

  • For construction products: it will be determined based on harmonised technical specifications or European Technical Assessments (ETA) adopted under the Construction Products Regulation (CPR).
  • For other products: the assessment will be based on the ecodesign requirements set by the ESPR (Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation).

Enhanced Screening of Foreign Direct Investment

While remaining open to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the EU is establishing – via the IAA – a stricter framework for large-scale projects in strategic sectors (batteries, electric vehicles, photovoltaics, and critical raw materials).

From now on, any investment exceeding €100 million in a sector where a single third country controls more than 40% of global manufacturing capacity is subject to explicit approval. This decision falls either under a competent national authority, which each Member State is required to designate, or directly under the European Commission.

To be granted the authorization, the investment must satisfy at least four of the six compliance criteria established by the regulation. These criteria concern:

  • The degree of control exercised by the foreign investor over the European entity;
  • Guarantees for the protection of intellectual property;
  • The share of research and development expenditure localized in Europe;
  • The proportion of the workforce employed within the Union;
  • The level of sourcing of inputs of European origin.

If you would like to discuss the impact of the EU’s Industrial Accelerator Act in more detail, please do get in touch with the GK team or our European partner, Euros / Agency.