Author Archives: GK Strategy

UK Drones Alliance – inaugural event

The UK drones sector faces significant regulatory barriers to growth at a time when the government’s is seeking to unlock the economic potential of drone technology. While progress is being made towards enabling routine ‘beyond visual line of sight’ (BVLOS) operations by 2027, questions remain around the pace of regulatory reform, the costs facing operators and the role of government in supporting the adoption of drone technologies. To explore these challenges and opportunities, on 5 November at Central Hall Westminster, GK Strategy hosted the inaugural meeting of the UK Drones Alliance, a new sector body bringing together drones businesses and policymakers to help shape a regulatory environment that supports growth in the UK drone sector. The event provided these businesses with the opportunity to hear directly from the Department for Transport’s (DfT) Future of Flight team, which leads the development of government policy towards emerging aviation technology, including drones.

The UK Drones Alliance will help drones businesses navigate the evolving policy and regulatory landscape through regular policy updates, industry events and engagement with policymakers and regulators to overcome barriers to growth, including restrictions on BVLOS operations. The inaugural event provided an opportunity for businesses to hear about the government’s priorities for the sector, discuss the barriers preventing wider adoption of drone technologies and identify areas where greater collaboration between industry and government could accelerate progress on regulatory reform.

Kamil, the DfT’s Future of Flight policy team lead, began the session by outlining the department’s work on drones, which is focused on championing the sector across government, supporting regulatory reform, building public trust and encouraging the adoption of drone technologies across public services. He highlighted the importance of working across government and with regulators to address the challenges facing the sector, recognising that the successful integration of drones into the regulation of UK airspace requires coordination across a wide range of policy areas.

One of the central themes of the discussion was the importance of cross-government collaboration. Kamil explained that the regulatory challenges facing the sector extend beyond aviation, with the Future of Flight team working with the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency , the Health and Safety Executive’s Chemicals Regulation Division, and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government  to ensure that other regulatory frameworks can be adapted to include drone operations. He also highlighted the importance of working with the Home Office to ensure the development of the sector aligns with the UK’s security requirements, including those relating to the risks posed by the unauthorised use of drones around prisons and other sensitive sites. This cross-government approach to regulating drones is particularly important given the range of applications for drone technologies, from medical deliveries to infrastructure inspection.

Reform of the regulatory framework governing drones and the role of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in implementing these regulations were also a major focus of the discussion. While the government has set out pathways towards routine BVLOS operations, attendees raised concerns about the practical implementation of existing regulations and the pace at which applications are being processed. Businesses highlighted significant delays in securing approvals under the Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) framework, which is used by the CAA to assess the risks associated with more complex drone operations. Some attendees reported that applications can take nine to ten months to be authorised and argued that these delays create considerable uncertainty for operators and risk discouraging innovation and investment in the sector. Several participants also questioned whether the existing regulatory framework is being implemented in a proportionate way, suggesting that the challenges facing operators are not necessarily with the regulations themselves, but with how they are being applied.

The discussion explored the government’s growing focus on the use of drones in military contexts and what this means for the wider civilian and commercial drones sector. The government’s recent announcement of a new Ministry of Defence (MOD)-led drone innovation unit was raised during the session. Kamil acknowledged that while the unit is likely to lead to regulatory innovation for defence drones, further details of its operation are still be announced. Furthermore, given that it is being led by the MOD, it remains unclear whether these regulatory benefits will extend to commercial drone operations. More broadly, he recognised that the public’s association of drones with warfare can create challenges for building trust in civilian applications. He explained that the DfT is working to promote the benefits of drones in public spaces and demonstrate their potential to improve public services, while maintaining close engagement with the MOD.

While the growing focus on the use of drones in a military context presents opportunities for the sector, it is important that this does not overshadow the significant economic and societal benefits of civilian and commercial drone applications. The diversity of the sector is one of its greatest strengths, but it can also make communicating a unified message to government, regulators and parliamentarians challenging. The UK Drones Alliance will seek to address this by bringing together businesses from across the sector to develop shared priorities and ensure that the industry’s collective voice is heard and respected in the policymaking process. By highlighting the breadth of civilian, commercial and defence applications, the Alliance will seek to ensure that the whole sector is supported by the government and that future regulatory reform benefits the entire drones sector.

The inaugural meeting demonstrated the importance of bringing businesses together to identify common challenges and develop a coordinated approach to engaging with policymakers and regulators. If you would like to get involved with the UK Drones Alliance, please get in touch with GK Strategy and the UK Drones Alliance via jacob.walsh@gkstrategy.com.

US midterm “Blue Tsunami” crests: Healthcare, tariffs, energy loom large on agenda

By Erin Caddell, Anchor Advisors, in partnership with GK Strategy 

The electoral blue wave that Republicans feared and Democrats worried might be a mirage crashed with massive force on Tuesday 3 November, with Democrats seizing control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate from the GOP in a nationwide repudiation of the policies of President Trump and his party during the first two years of his second term. 

As of 7 am ET on Wednesday (12 pm GMT), all major US news networks (yes, even Fox News, the favorite network of Trump and the Republican Party) were projecting that Democrats will take control of the House by what appears to be a comfortable margin above the minimum 218 seats, flipping at least 33 Republican-held House seats. Critically, Democrats will also win control of the Senate with at least 54 seats (several races have yet to be called). Democrats flipped Senate seats in at least six states that Trump won in the 2024 presidential race: Iowa, Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, and Texas, while flipping a seventh – Maine – held by a Republican, and holding on to a Michigan Senate seat where the incumbent retired. Democrats also won several high-profile state governor’s races in states which previously held GOP governors and where Trump won in 2024 including Iowa, Georgia, Nevada, Texas and Ohio. In one of many stunning facts emerging from the evening, Kansas elected Democrat Adam Hamilton by a 5-point margin two years after voting for Trump by 16 points in the 2024 presidential race – the first time since 1932 that the state has elected a Democrat to the Senate.  

What do the results mean for US-focussed investors and corporates? We offer the following few initial thoughts as the dust starts to settle from these stunning results: 

First, with control of both houses of Congress, Democrats will gain key blocking votes over the federal budget and material meaningful domestic policy change even before the 2028 presidential election. While Democrats will not gain a veto-proof 6o-vote Senate majority, as of this writing winning 54 seats is an amazing result that even optimistic Democrats hesitated to consider heading into Tuesday. With the ability to lose up to three votes within its own party on given ballots, and perhaps to pick up six Republican votes to achieve a filibuster-proof majority, Democrats will use the substantial leverage it gained through its big election wins to push the agenda items that dominated its candidates’ winning campaigns: healthcare, tariffs and energy key among them. Energy may become an issue even before the new Congress is seated: a bipartisan bill that has been negotiated in Congress for months to speed permitting reform for energy and other infrastructure projects, one way to address the high gasoline and diesel prices that proved to be one of the key voter criticisms of Trump’s policies, could get a boost from Tuesday’s results and gain traction in the “lame-duck” session when Congress returns to DC later this year. Heading into 2027, the Democratic-led Congress is likely to open new legislative fronts on energy and climate policy including renewable energy; the Trump Administration’s environmental regulatory policies; and data centers (and the energy used to power them), public opposition to which drove multiple key Senate races. 

With regards to healthcare, incoming Speaker of the House Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) already spoke on election night about moving to reverse or slow portions of the cuts to the Medicaid health insurance program for the poor included in the One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB) passed by Trump and the GOP Congress last year. We could envision a deal to walk back some of the Medicaid cuts and tighter eligibility requirements under the OBBB gaining support from Democrats and some Republicans in 2027, with Trump reluctantly going along – a model for the kind of legislation that could pass in the new Congress. 

Second, Republicans in Congress as well as those who decide to run for the Republican nomination for president in 2028 will be quicker to distance themselves from Trump given the scale of the midterms’ blue wave. Winning Republican candidates returning to Washington will be more likely to disavow the most controversial elements of the Trump 2.0 agenda, including the harsh immigration enforcement policies of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the sharp cuts to domestic spending programs imposed by the OBBB and other Trump Administration actions; and the tariffs imposed on foreign goods by Trump in his first two years.  

With regards to trade, we found it notable that Mike Rogers, the Republican candidate for U.S. Senate from Michigan, broke with Trump in the late stages of his campaign to criticize the tariffs imposed by the U.S. on Canada in recent months, which have had an outsized impact on Michigan given the substantial cross-border trade with its northern neighbor (Rogers’ race was called in favor of his Democratic opponent Abdul El-Sayed overnight). Tariffs also played a role in the US Senate race in the Canadian border state of Maine, where Republican incumbent Susan Collins was unseated by Democrat Troy Jackson. We understand from one of our contacts that one of the first bills House Democrats plan to table once gaining the majority in the chamber in January 2027 is legislation to condemn the Canadian tariffs imposed recently by Trump. Will Republicans, chastened by the big Democratic win and positioning themselves to run for House or Senate (or the presidency) less fearful of the inevitable critical Trump tweet, cross the aisle to vote for such a bill? This is the new calculus members of Congress and their advisors will weigh as they contemplate the post-midterms landscape. 

Third, the turnover in Administration staff that often occurs after U.S. midterm elections will likely be higher than normal given the scale of the Blue Wave. White House staffers and other Administration officials will not want to be subpoenaed and dragged before Congress month after month to explain the second Trump Administration’s many scandals, a tactic Democrats have already said they will employ given the majority. Many senior and even junior administration staffers will literally face the choice of whether to pay to retain their own lawyers just to remain in their jobs for the next two years.  

Fourth and finally, federal agencies will face much more scrutiny from a hostile House and Senate in the final two years of Trump’s presidency. Trump Administration officials will be asked to testify regularly before Democrat-led House and Senate committees. While one might think the pugilistic Trump Administration will welcome such confrontations, these hearings, and the process of responding to the numerous data requests that accompany them, occupies agency time and resources that would otherwise be spend on additional regulatory actions. We have seen this occur with both Democratic and Republican lame-duck presidencies in the past where agencies largely move to defend in court and on the Hill the rules they promulgated in the first two years of the Administration, rather than attempting to finalize new ones in a more hostile political environment. 

As an old saying goes, elections have consequences. Democrats will be emboldened and Republicans will move quickly to contemplate the post-Trump era following the emphatic message delivered by American voters in last night’s midterm elections. 

 

U.S. midterm elections approach: What will be the policy implications?

As the U.S. midterm elections approach on Tuesday 3 November, plenty of election forecasters are making their predictions of which candidates in the House and Senate will win or lose. But what will be the public-policy implications of the midterms for U.S.-focused investors and corporates? Erin Caddell of GK Strategy’s American partner Anchor Advisors looks below briefly at three scenarios: Democrats win both the House and Senate; Democrats win the House, but not the Senate; and Republicans hold both chambers. 

Scenario #1: Both House and Senate flip. This is the most likely outcome based on most non-partisan election prognosticators, as well as betting markets: as of 2 November, Polymarket and Kalshi ascribe a 94-95% likelihood to a shift in power in the House, and a 73-74%+ chance of the same in the Senate. Should both houses flip, domestic policy would change substantially in the next Congress. With control of both houses of Congress, Democrats would gain key blocking votes over the budget. Firstly, while Democrats will almost certainly not gain a veto-proof majority, the party will use its leverage to agree to top Republican priorities (think defense) only if the GOP makes concessions on Democratic demands. For clues as to where these asks could fall, look to where Republican candidates in tough re-election races are breaking with Trump: tariffs, immigration enforcement, and healthcare (a key contributor to rising costs for families) all come to mind.  

Secondly, Republican candidates for president in 2028 would immediately pivot to distance themselves from Trump if the blue wave indeed leads to a Democratic-controlled House and Senate. Winning Republican candidates returning to Washington will be more likely to disavow the most controversial elements of the Trump 2.0 agenda. Thirdly, the turnover in Administration staff that often occurs after midterm elections will accelerate if the House and/or Senate flip. White House staffers and other Administration officials will not want to be dragged before congressional committees month after month, which is the agenda Democrats have already telegraphed they will employ should they win one or both chambers.  

Finally, if both houses of Congress flip, federal agencies will face much more scrutiny from a hostile Congress in the final two years of Trump’s presidency. Trump Administration officials will be asked to testify regularly before Democrat-led House and/or Senate committees. While one might think the Trump Administration would welcome such confrontations, these hearings, and the process of responding to the numerous data requests that accompany them, occupies agency time and resources that would otherwise be spend on additional regulatory actions. We have seen this occur with both Democratic and Republican lame-duck presidencies in the past where agencies largely move to defend in court and on the Hill the rules they promulgated in the first two years of the Administration, rather than attempting to finalize new ones in a more hostile political environment.  

Scenario #2: Democrats win House but not Senate. Should Republicans hold the Senate – and note that even a 50-50 split would be enough as the VP breaks ties – Trump and the GOP can say their agenda remains popular with the electorate despite near-term headwinds (gas prices, inflation etc.), and that retaining the House is nearly impossible for the president’s party in midterms. MAGA would remain a force into 2028, with Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio the most likely standard-bearers for the party as it enters the post-Trump era. 

Even without Senate control, Democrats would gain substantial oversight/subpoena powers should they win the House. Democrats are already planning an active agenda for investigations of Trump, his family and Administration allies in 2027. The question is how far will they want to push before upsetting Trump voters who crossed over to vote Democrat in 2026? Democrats and Republicans in Congress alike will be under pressure from voters to act on “affordability”, the buzzword in the 2024 and now 2026 elections. House Democrat working groups that were established to create action plans for the next Congress should the party win a majority give an indication of the party’s priorities. Energy permitting reform, the Farm Bill, AI regulation, healthcare and the “care economy” (childcare, early-childhood education, etc.) are all are potential areas for bipartisan agreement – and where Trump might be able to be brought along to support a deal struck in Congress, however reluctantly. 

House Democrats’ “Cost of Living” Planning Groups 

Working Group  Heads 
Healthcare  Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) & Terri Sewell (D-AL) 
Housing  Laura Friedman (D-CA) & Emilia Sykes (D-OH) 
Groceries and Goods  Marie Gluesenkamp Perez (D-WA), Hillary Scholten (D-MI) & Jill Tokuda (D-HI) 
Gas and Utilities  Nikki Budzinski (D-IL) & Mike Levin (D-CA) 
Care-giving  Sarah McBride (D-DE) and Morgan McGarvey (D-KY) 

 

Scenario #3: Republicans hold both House and Senate. If Trump and the GOP defy the polls and hold both the House and Senate, it would be read as a validation of the Trump Administration’s policies in his second term – that a corporate-first approach, bolstered by aggressive immigration enforcement and protectionist trade policy is supported by the electorate even in the face of near-term economic headwinds. Republican candidates would embrace MAGA policies in their 2028 campaigns, led by VP Vance and Secretary of State Rubio, the two most visible standard-bearers of the post-Trump MAGA movement. Defense firms would be a clear winner of a GOP congressional hold in 2026, as Republicans would push through a large increase in defense spending to finance the Iran war as well as overall military readiness. Similarly, Big Tech and large AI data-center developers and infrastructure providers would receive a boost, as a GOP win would be viewed as supportive of Trump 2.0’s no-holds-barred AI strategy. 

View from the US: Independent candidates reclaiming the center in U.S. politics

Erin Caddell of GK Strategy’s American partner Anchor Advisors examines whether a new cohort of independent congressional candidates can capitalise on voter dissatisfaction with the two main parties, and what their influence could mean for investors and businesses

Independent American political movements have a colorful history. In 1828, the Anti-Masonic Party was founded with the sole purpose of dismantling the American Freemason Society, a fraternal organization that counted several of the Founding Fathers among its members and was thought by some to have undue influence in the young nation. Though it disbanded in 1840 (while the Freemasons kept going), the Anti-Masonic Party was the first in the US to hold nominating conventions and publish a platform, setting a precedent followed to this day. Founded in 1879 by former Confederate general William Mahone, the Readjuster Party reacted to economic stress in post-Civil War Virginia by working to cancel around one-third of that state’s debt. In the 20th century, Activist Symon Gould ran for president in 1960 and 1964 exclusively to promote vegetarianism. And then there was the hippie-era Youth International Party, or “Yippies”, which used irony and theatrics – in 1968 the party nominated a pig for president – to underline a serious message: that both major parties had allowed the Vietnam War to become a disaster for America.

Wonderful anecdotes all. But their quirkiness also highlights the dominance of the Republican and Democratic parties and their predecessors over much of American history. The best showing for an independent came in 1912, when the newly formed Progressive Party finished second in the presidential election with 27% – its candidate was Teddy Roosevelt, who had previously served two terms as a Republican president.

Despite this checkered history, some argue a new moment has arrived for American independent candidates, driven by dissatisfaction among many voters toward the Republican and Democratic parties. Gallup reported in January 2026 that a record-high 45% of U.S. voters surveyed characterized themselves as independents over Republicans or Democrats (27% each); a majority of Millennials (born 1981-1996) and Generation Z (1997-2007) identified as independent in the survey.

Motivated by distaste with the status quo and hoping to capitalize on the demographic trends cited above, a small but ambitious cohort of independent candidates has emerged to run for federal and state office in November. Over the summer, Anchor Advisors was invited to participate in a gathering of nine such candidates, as well as independent donors and activists, hosted in West Virginia by political-action groups Americans Together and the Independent Leadership Council.

One candidate featured at the event was Rep. Kevin Kiley, 41, the only current Member of the U.S. House registered as an independent, representing a suburban district outside Sacramento. Running for his third U.S. House term, Kiley switched his party affiliation from Republican to independent in March 2026 following California’s decision to redraw its congressional map in an attempt to make it easier to elect Democrats (part of a national tit-for-tat gerrymandering among both Democrat- and Republican-leaning states this year). Even before leaving the GOP, Kiley demonstrated a heterodox political ideology. A longtime critic of Democratic California Governor Gavin Newsom, Kiley introduced a bill in Congress to block a proposed tax on wealthy individuals in California, while breaking with the Republican party on issues such as tariff and reductions in federal health insurance. Freed from the party label, Kiley has embraced his independent status even more, criticizing Trump’s recent decision to ban select media outlets from attending White House events, while urging Newsom to accept new Republican-supported federal funding to support school-choice programs, a frequent target of Democratic criticism. A September poll found Kiley tied in his re-election race at 37% with Democrat Richard Pan, with 26% undecided.

Another candidate who spoke at the West Virginia event is Seth Bodnar, 47, a first-time candidate running as an independent for U.S. Senate in Montana. Bodnar boasts a CV that politicians from any party would envy: an Army Green Beret with multiple overseas deployments, Rhodes Scholar, and president of the University of Montana for eight years. Bodnar’s platform represents a mix of conservative and progressive ideas (see below).

Select Platform Items of Seth Bodnar, Independent U.S. Senate Candidate – Montana

“End the costly and unauthorized war in Iran”

No further strikes or ground troop deployments without congressional authorization.

“Stop reckless tariffs driving up prices”

Support strategic tariffs used as leverage against countries cheating on trade, not

blanket tariffs on allies like Canada.

“Fight data centers and stand up to Big Tech”

Give local communities authority to block proposed data centers.

Bar utilities from raising bills for residential ratepayers due to data-center development.

“Protect the Second Amendment”

Opposes a federal assault weapons ban or a universal background check mandate.

“End dark money in our elections”

Overturn Citizens United [US Supreme Court decision that liberalized election spending].

Increase transparency requirements for dark money spending in elections.

“Secure our border and enforce immigration laws”

Giving the northern border the same attention and resources as the southern border.

Source: Sethformontana.com 

What does this mean for U.S.-focused investors and corporates? The emergence of independent candidates in the current election cycle is a reminder that despite the powerful forces driving American politics to extremes on both the right and the left, centrism remains an important dynamic that will well shape policy and politics in the next Congress and beyond. At the West Virginia gathering, former U.S. Senator Joe Manchin, a co-founder of Americans Together and co-host of the event in his native state, told the group that in a legislature narrowly divided among two parties, even a small number of independents can wield substantial power as both parties seek their votes. Manchin speaks from experience: the three-term moderate Democrat Senator became a key swing vote during Biden’s presidency. Manchin killed the Biden-backed Build Back Better proposal of green-energy and social-spending programs in 2021, then helped revive portions of the bill into what was signed into law as the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022, the biggest legislative achievement of Biden’s presidency.

Regardless of the outcome of next month’s elections, members of Congress will be under pressure to respond to voters’ concerns in 2027 and 2028. Top of the list will be “affordability”, a catch-all for the many ways in which stuff is costing more across the U.S. Here, the deal-making spirit of a small group of independents could help jump-start proposed bills that have gotten bogged down by partisanship. A short list of possible areas for agreement: Energy permitting reform to speed up and ease regulation on energy and other construction projects; a full reauthorization of the Farm Bill (which has been subject to short-term extensions for the last six years), providing policy certainty to an agricultural sector currently racked by rising input costs and tariff volatility; and governance of data-centers, which if Congress does not act will surely be subject to a patchwork of state and local rules as public outcry against data centers rises. Unbeholden to the legacies of the two parties, independent candidates are also more willing to discuss ways to reduce the federal deficit and debt, a source of potential near-term disruption in the form of spending cuts and/or tax increases, but a welcome development for any long-term investor or operator of U.S. assets.

Can a new crop of independent candidates shake up the two-party system? Or will they suffer the short-lived fates of American third-party political movements of the past? We’ll see starting in a couple of weeks.

Palantir, politics and the future of NHS data

Drawing on his experience as a health minister and chair of the Health and Social Care Select Committee, GK’s strategic advisor Steve Brine examines the debate over Palantir’s role in the NHS and argues that evidence of patient benefit, delivery risks and credible alternatives should guide ministers’ decisions. 

Senior Vice-President of Palantir UK Tom Watson is an old friend. We were in the Commons together for nine years and our paths crossed many times, not about health it must be said, but music, where we share a vision of creative sovereignty in the face of a powerful challenge from big tech.

Tom’s return to the political headlines was always likely to provoke a reaction but I was pleased to see him back; primarily because it means he once again had the all-clear in his battle with prostate cancer.

Back how? The former deputy leader of the Labour Party has joined American technology company Palantir as a senior vice-president. The appointment comes just as ministers approach a big decision about the company’s future role in the NHS.

Appearing recently on a BBC podcast, Tom warned against allowing what he called “mob rule” to determine government procurement decisions. His intervention was characteristically direct, but it raised a question that goes well beyond one company.

The bottom line is this: should our government allow political discomfort (justified or otherwise) with a supplier to override the practical interests of NHS patients?

At the heart of this debate is the NHS Federated Data Platform (FDP), a programme designed to connect information held across different parts of the health service, helping clinicians and managers make decisions about patient care, waiting lists and capacity.

In November 2023, a consortium led by Palantir secured a seven-year contract to deliver the FDP. Ministers now face a decision over a contractual break point in the early part of 2027.

Two parliamentary committees have recommended that the government take the option to break the contract and seek an alternative supplier.

And so, the search begins for compelling evidence that the existing arrangement is failing, or that a demonstrably better alternative exists, because in my experience the NHS cannot afford another technological false start.

Some NHS users have indeed complained about the technology itself. A British Medical Journal (BMJ) investigation published in July this year reported that NHS leaders had privately described aspects of the FDP as clunky and offering a poor user experience.

Having served as a health minister, and subsequently chaired the Health and Social Care Select Committee, I know how often the ambitions of NHS reform collide with the practical realities of delivery. The entire NHS Ten Year Plan is a case in point!

For decades, the NHS has struggled with fragmented information systems, inconsistent data and organisations unable to communicate with one another.

The consequences are not abstract. They mean operating theatres sitting underused while patients wait for treatment, unnecessary delays in discharging people from hospital, and clinicians spending time navigating disconnected systems.

The FDP was conceived to address precisely these challenges. It is not, as some commentary might suggest, a vast new database into which everyone’s medical records are poured. Rather, it provides a means of connecting and analysing information across existing systems, subject to governance and access controls.

The NHS does not need LESS intelligent use of data. It needs considerably MORE.

Indeed, the government’s wider ambitions for a modernised health service, including that Ten Year Plan, depend on greater use of artificial intelligence and a more joined-up approach to care.

Walking away from an established programme without a credible replacement risks repeating one of the NHS’s most frustrating habits: announcing transformation, beginning implementation and then changing direction.

Supporters of the FDP point to encouraging improvements. NHS England has reported increased theatre utilisation, more patients receiving procedures, improvements in cancer pathways and reductions in delayed hospital discharges.

But there is a necessary qualification.

Recent scrutiny, including by the Financial Times, has questioned whether some of the headline improvements can be directly attributed to the FDP. Some trusts have stopped using certain tools on the platform, and NHS England has acknowledged that improvements observed after the platform’s introduction do not automatically establish cause and effect.

That criticism deserves serious attention. But there is an important distinction between questioning the measurement of benefits and concluding that the technology has no value.

It is also striking that, unlike some previous NHS technology programmes, the FDP has not generated an overwhelming public backlash from the clinicians and operational staff expected to use it. There are complaints about usability and uneven adoption, certainly, but these sit alongside positive accounts from NHS organisations reporting practical improvements.

That is not proof of success, but neither is it the picture of an obviously failing system.

Incomplete evaluation is an argument for stronger scrutiny, not necessarily for abandoning a programme midway through implementation.

 

The politics of Palantir

Of course, much of the opposition to Palantir has little to do with such cold-eyed scrutiny of NHS operational performance.

The company’s American ownership, its co-founder Peter Thiel, and its work with defence, intelligence and immigration agencies have made it a lightning rod for political controversy.

These are matters on which people can hold sincerely different views, but we should be careful not to confuse opposition to a company’s activities elsewhere with evidence that its NHS contract is inappropriate or unsafe.

Palantir is not the owner of NHS patient data. It acts as a data processor, with NHS organisations retaining responsibility as data controllers.

The NHS relies extensively on international technology companies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, medical device suppliers and other private-sector partners. Their expertise is essential.

Surely the relevant test should be whether a supplier meets the necessary standards of security, effectiveness, accountability and value for money, not whether its founders hold political views with which some Labour MPs happen to disagree?

There are legitimate questions about supplier dependence and public trust, but they deserve to be distinguished from objections rooted primarily in political hostility towards the company.

Tom Watson’s intervention is interesting because it highlights an uncomfortable reality for government. Public procurement must operate within the law, but it must also serve the public interest.

In a recent conversation, someone described the FDP to me as a form of technological infrastructure that another supplier could, in theory, provide.

That is true, but it risks understating the complexity of what has been built. Palantir does not simply provide the cloud infrastructure on which the platform runs; its technology helps integrate data and supports the applications and operational workflows built around it.

There may well be credible alternatives, including other major international technology companies. But replacing the supplier is not necessarily the same as switching electricity providers. The government would need to establish what could be transferred, what would need rebuilding, how long that would take and at what cost.

And if the objective is greater technological sovereignty, replacing one American supplier with another hardly settles the argument.

 

Ministerial judgement

The government faces a difficult decision but, in my experience, the variables shift considerably when you’re making a political one rather than an operational one.

Palantir should be held rigorously to its contractual obligations, and the evidence of benefit must be strengthened. But – and this is my key point – the burden of proof should also apply to those advocating termination.

What would replace the existing platform? How quickly could an alternative supplier be brought in, and at what cost? What risks would that impose on patients, and would it deliver better results?

These are precisely the questions ministers must ask, and I am confident they are.

The wider lesson is that governments must resist the temptation to confuse a politically attractive announcement with successful public policy. Here I am less confident.

My instinct is that ministers should not exercise the February 2027 break clause unless the evidence presents a compelling case for doing so.

Ultimately, patients waiting for operations, cancer diagnoses or a safe discharge from hospital will not judge ministers by the ideological purity of their decisions.

They will judge them by whether the NHS is ‘fixed’.