Category Archives: Government

Abolishing NHS England: Rewiring the state or just moving the furniture around?

Drawing on his experience as a health minister and chair of the Health and Social Care Select Committee, GK’s strategic advisor Steve Brine examines what the abolition of NHS England means for independent providers, commercial partners and the government’s ambitions to improve patient care

I’ve described the government’s decision to abolish NHS England as ‘a huge roll of the dice’. Nothing we’ve heard since has made me more confident that the gamble will pay off.

The latest announcement that a new ‘Special Health Authority’ will accommodate NHS England’s seven regional teams is a sensible solution to a problem, and let’s be clear, that the government has created for itself.

The writers of ‘Yes Minister!’ would be proud of abolishing a quango only to find the creation of another quango carrying out some of the functions of the previous quango that is being abolished.

There is, however, a more consequential question beyond the machinery of government change: what does this mean for the organisations, including those in the independent sector, who work with the NHS to deliver care, technology, innovation and better outcomes for patients?

For companies accustomed to engaging NHS England nationally, the transfer of functions into the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) raises immediate questions about relationships, decision-making and accountability. Who will commission, approve, procure and ultimately champion innovation? Will a more politically accountable centre become a more accessible one, or simply a more cautious and centralised one?

The regional picture is more complicated in my opinion. NHS England’s regional teams have played important roles in overseeing performance, service planning and important relationships with providers. Their transition into a new body, without a clearly defined end date, leaves businesses navigating an uncertain landscape alongside ICBs whose own future responsibilities remain unresolved.

For independent providers and commercial partners, clarity matters above all else. Investment decisions can’t simply be put on hold while Whitehall redraws its spider diagram. Nor can the NHS afford to lose the capacity, expertise and innovation that external partners bring to a system under extraordinary pressure.

Having served as a health minister, and subsequently chaired the House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee, I know that changing structures is considerably easier than changing outcomes. You cannot reorganise your way out of a productivity problem and that’s one reason I wouldn’t have touched NHS reorganisation with a barge-pole post 2024.

My hunch is that Andy Burnham understands this better than most. He’s been prepared to put local government reorganisation into the long grass yet the NHS is being asked to undertake precisely the kind of structural upheaval that will sap the very energy needed for delivery.

This government likes to talk in ‘ten year plans’ but it’s landed itself with an NHS sized headache precisely because the NHS England decision was not part of a strategy for delivery in this part of the public sector voters cherish so much. If it was, abolition would have been central – and announced within – the NHS Ten Year Plan not something out of the blue that preceded it.

All said, there is an opportunity here. A smaller, clearer centre and genuinely empowered local systems could make the NHS a better partner for the independent sector, accelerating innovation and supporting care closer to home; all key planks of the decade long plan for health. But that will only happen if responsibility, budgets and decision-making follow.

If the government want to rewire the state, it should start with the connections between services that patients actually use, rather than the wiring diagram in Whitehall.

Ultimately, patients won’t judge Andy Burnham on the structures he abolishes; whether he wants them gone or not. They’ll judge him on whether the NHS works better. So should we.

U.S. midterm elections approach: What will be the policy implications?

As the U.S. midterm elections approach on Tuesday 3 November, plenty of election forecasters are making their predictions of which candidates in the House and Senate will win or lose. But what will be the public-policy implications of the midterms for U.S.-focused investors and corporates? Erin Caddell of GK Strategy’s American partner Anchor Advisors looks below briefly at three scenarios: Democrats win both the House and Senate; Democrats win the House, but not the Senate; and Republicans hold both chambers. 

Scenario #1: Both House and Senate flip. This is the most likely outcome based on most non-partisan election prognosticators, as well as betting markets: as of 2 November, Polymarket and Kalshi ascribe a 94-95% likelihood to a shift in power in the House, and a 73-74%+ chance of the same in the Senate. Should both houses flip, domestic policy would change substantially in the next Congress. With control of both houses of Congress, Democrats would gain key blocking votes over the budget. Firstly, while Democrats will almost certainly not gain a veto-proof majority, the party will use its leverage to agree to top Republican priorities (think defense) only if the GOP makes concessions on Democratic demands. For clues as to where these asks could fall, look to where Republican candidates in tough re-election races are breaking with Trump: tariffs, immigration enforcement, and healthcare (a key contributor to rising costs for families) all come to mind.  

Secondly, Republican candidates for president in 2028 would immediately pivot to distance themselves from Trump if the blue wave indeed leads to a Democratic-controlled House and Senate. Winning Republican candidates returning to Washington will be more likely to disavow the most controversial elements of the Trump 2.0 agenda. Thirdly, the turnover in Administration staff that often occurs after midterm elections will accelerate if the House and/or Senate flip. White House staffers and other Administration officials will not want to be dragged before congressional committees month after month, which is the agenda Democrats have already telegraphed they will employ should they win one or both chambers.  

Finally, if both houses of Congress flip, federal agencies will face much more scrutiny from a hostile Congress in the final two years of Trump’s presidency. Trump Administration officials will be asked to testify regularly before Democrat-led House and/or Senate committees. While one might think the Trump Administration would welcome such confrontations, these hearings, and the process of responding to the numerous data requests that accompany them, occupies agency time and resources that would otherwise be spend on additional regulatory actions. We have seen this occur with both Democratic and Republican lame-duck presidencies in the past where agencies largely move to defend in court and on the Hill the rules they promulgated in the first two years of the Administration, rather than attempting to finalize new ones in a more hostile political environment.  

Scenario #2: Democrats win House but not Senate. Should Republicans hold the Senate – and note that even a 50-50 split would be enough as the VP breaks ties – Trump and the GOP can say their agenda remains popular with the electorate despite near-term headwinds (gas prices, inflation etc.), and that retaining the House is nearly impossible for the president’s party in midterms. MAGA would remain a force into 2028, with Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio the most likely standard-bearers for the party as it enters the post-Trump era. 

Even without Senate control, Democrats would gain substantial oversight/subpoena powers should they win the House. Democrats are already planning an active agenda for investigations of Trump, his family and Administration allies in 2027. The question is how far will they want to push before upsetting Trump voters who crossed over to vote Democrat in 2026? Democrats and Republicans in Congress alike will be under pressure from voters to act on “affordability”, the buzzword in the 2024 and now 2026 elections. House Democrat working groups that were established to create action plans for the next Congress should the party win a majority give an indication of the party’s priorities. Energy permitting reform, the Farm Bill, AI regulation, healthcare and the “care economy” (childcare, early-childhood education, etc.) are all are potential areas for bipartisan agreement – and where Trump might be able to be brought along to support a deal struck in Congress, however reluctantly. 

House Democrats’ “Cost of Living” Planning Groups 

Working Group  Heads 
Healthcare  Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) & Terri Sewell (D-AL) 
Housing  Laura Friedman (D-CA) & Emilia Sykes (D-OH) 
Groceries and Goods  Marie Gluesenkamp Perez (D-WA), Hillary Scholten (D-MI) & Jill Tokuda (D-HI) 
Gas and Utilities  Nikki Budzinski (D-IL) & Mike Levin (D-CA) 
Care-giving  Sarah McBride (D-DE) and Morgan McGarvey (D-KY) 

 

Scenario #3: Republicans hold both House and Senate. If Trump and the GOP defy the polls and hold both the House and Senate, it would be read as a validation of the Trump Administration’s policies in his second term – that a corporate-first approach, bolstered by aggressive immigration enforcement and protectionist trade policy is supported by the electorate even in the face of near-term economic headwinds. Republican candidates would embrace MAGA policies in their 2028 campaigns, led by VP Vance and Secretary of State Rubio, the two most visible standard-bearers of the post-Trump MAGA movement. Defense firms would be a clear winner of a GOP congressional hold in 2026, as Republicans would push through a large increase in defense spending to finance the Iran war as well as overall military readiness. Similarly, Big Tech and large AI data-center developers and infrastructure providers would receive a boost, as a GOP win would be viewed as supportive of Trump 2.0’s no-holds-barred AI strategy. 

Palantir, politics and the future of NHS data

Drawing on his experience as a health minister and chair of the Health and Social Care Select Committee, GK’s strategic advisor Steve Brine examines the debate over Palantir’s role in the NHS and argues that evidence of patient benefit, delivery risks and credible alternatives should guide ministers’ decisions. 

Senior Vice-President of Palantir UK Tom Watson is an old friend. We were in the Commons together for nine years and our paths crossed many times, not about health it must be said, but music, where we share a vision of creative sovereignty in the face of a powerful challenge from big tech.

Tom’s return to the political headlines was always likely to provoke a reaction but I was pleased to see him back; primarily because it means he once again had the all-clear in his battle with prostate cancer.

Back how? The former deputy leader of the Labour Party has joined American technology company Palantir as a senior vice-president. The appointment comes just as ministers approach a big decision about the company’s future role in the NHS.

Appearing recently on a BBC podcast, Tom warned against allowing what he called “mob rule” to determine government procurement decisions. His intervention was characteristically direct, but it raised a question that goes well beyond one company.

The bottom line is this: should our government allow political discomfort (justified or otherwise) with a supplier to override the practical interests of NHS patients?

At the heart of this debate is the NHS Federated Data Platform (FDP), a programme designed to connect information held across different parts of the health service, helping clinicians and managers make decisions about patient care, waiting lists and capacity.

In November 2023, a consortium led by Palantir secured a seven-year contract to deliver the FDP. Ministers now face a decision over a contractual break point in the early part of 2027.

Two parliamentary committees have recommended that the government take the option to break the contract and seek an alternative supplier.

And so, the search begins for compelling evidence that the existing arrangement is failing, or that a demonstrably better alternative exists, because in my experience the NHS cannot afford another technological false start.

Some NHS users have indeed complained about the technology itself. A British Medical Journal (BMJ) investigation published in July this year reported that NHS leaders had privately described aspects of the FDP as clunky and offering a poor user experience.

Having served as a health minister, and subsequently chaired the Health and Social Care Select Committee, I know how often the ambitions of NHS reform collide with the practical realities of delivery. The entire NHS Ten Year Plan is a case in point!

For decades, the NHS has struggled with fragmented information systems, inconsistent data and organisations unable to communicate with one another.

The consequences are not abstract. They mean operating theatres sitting underused while patients wait for treatment, unnecessary delays in discharging people from hospital, and clinicians spending time navigating disconnected systems.

The FDP was conceived to address precisely these challenges. It is not, as some commentary might suggest, a vast new database into which everyone’s medical records are poured. Rather, it provides a means of connecting and analysing information across existing systems, subject to governance and access controls.

The NHS does not need LESS intelligent use of data. It needs considerably MORE.

Indeed, the government’s wider ambitions for a modernised health service, including that Ten Year Plan, depend on greater use of artificial intelligence and a more joined-up approach to care.

Walking away from an established programme without a credible replacement risks repeating one of the NHS’s most frustrating habits: announcing transformation, beginning implementation and then changing direction.

Supporters of the FDP point to encouraging improvements. NHS England has reported increased theatre utilisation, more patients receiving procedures, improvements in cancer pathways and reductions in delayed hospital discharges.

But there is a necessary qualification.

Recent scrutiny, including by the Financial Times, has questioned whether some of the headline improvements can be directly attributed to the FDP. Some trusts have stopped using certain tools on the platform, and NHS England has acknowledged that improvements observed after the platform’s introduction do not automatically establish cause and effect.

That criticism deserves serious attention. But there is an important distinction between questioning the measurement of benefits and concluding that the technology has no value.

It is also striking that, unlike some previous NHS technology programmes, the FDP has not generated an overwhelming public backlash from the clinicians and operational staff expected to use it. There are complaints about usability and uneven adoption, certainly, but these sit alongside positive accounts from NHS organisations reporting practical improvements.

That is not proof of success, but neither is it the picture of an obviously failing system.

Incomplete evaluation is an argument for stronger scrutiny, not necessarily for abandoning a programme midway through implementation.

 

The politics of Palantir

Of course, much of the opposition to Palantir has little to do with such cold-eyed scrutiny of NHS operational performance.

The company’s American ownership, its co-founder Peter Thiel, and its work with defence, intelligence and immigration agencies have made it a lightning rod for political controversy.

These are matters on which people can hold sincerely different views, but we should be careful not to confuse opposition to a company’s activities elsewhere with evidence that its NHS contract is inappropriate or unsafe.

Palantir is not the owner of NHS patient data. It acts as a data processor, with NHS organisations retaining responsibility as data controllers.

The NHS relies extensively on international technology companies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, medical device suppliers and other private-sector partners. Their expertise is essential.

Surely the relevant test should be whether a supplier meets the necessary standards of security, effectiveness, accountability and value for money, not whether its founders hold political views with which some Labour MPs happen to disagree?

There are legitimate questions about supplier dependence and public trust, but they deserve to be distinguished from objections rooted primarily in political hostility towards the company.

Tom Watson’s intervention is interesting because it highlights an uncomfortable reality for government. Public procurement must operate within the law, but it must also serve the public interest.

In a recent conversation, someone described the FDP to me as a form of technological infrastructure that another supplier could, in theory, provide.

That is true, but it risks understating the complexity of what has been built. Palantir does not simply provide the cloud infrastructure on which the platform runs; its technology helps integrate data and supports the applications and operational workflows built around it.

There may well be credible alternatives, including other major international technology companies. But replacing the supplier is not necessarily the same as switching electricity providers. The government would need to establish what could be transferred, what would need rebuilding, how long that would take and at what cost.

And if the objective is greater technological sovereignty, replacing one American supplier with another hardly settles the argument.

 

Ministerial judgement

The government faces a difficult decision but, in my experience, the variables shift considerably when you’re making a political one rather than an operational one.

Palantir should be held rigorously to its contractual obligations, and the evidence of benefit must be strengthened. But – and this is my key point – the burden of proof should also apply to those advocating termination.

What would replace the existing platform? How quickly could an alternative supplier be brought in, and at what cost? What risks would that impose on patients, and would it deliver better results?

These are precisely the questions ministers must ask, and I am confident they are.

The wider lesson is that governments must resist the temptation to confuse a politically attractive announcement with successful public policy. Here I am less confident.

My instinct is that ministers should not exercise the February 2027 break clause unless the evidence presents a compelling case for doing so.

Ultimately, patients waiting for operations, cancer diagnoses or a safe discharge from hospital will not judge ministers by the ideological purity of their decisions.

They will judge them by whether the NHS is ‘fixed’.

GK Insight - How Integrated Care Systems can reduce health inequalities

Digital health: Are we transforming the NHS or merely digitising what’s there?

Drawing on his experience as a health minister and chair of the Health and Social Care Select Committee, GK’s strategic advisor Steve Brine examines the government’s ambition to shift the NHS from analogue to digital, arguing that its success will depend on whether technology genuinely transforms care and reduces frontline pressures, rather than simply digitising how patients access them.

The Labour government has made ‘analogue to digital’ one of the defining ambitions of the10-Year Health Plan. It is difficult to argue with.

A next-generation NHS App, (finally) a Single Patient Record, greater use of AI and digitally enabled neighbourhood health all offer the prospect of a service that is easier to navigate, more personalised and – whisper it – more productive.

Given the pressures facing the NHS workforce and public finances, technology is no longer an interesting addition to health reform; it is central to whether much of that reform can actually be delivered. Jim Mackey, Chief Executive of NHS England, believes this to his core.

But there is an important question underneath all this ambition: how deliverable is it in practice, and are we moving further away or getting closer since the change of personnel in government?

For most people, their interaction with the NHS happens through primary care. That means the digital NHS will ultimately succeed or fail not in Whitehall, but in thousands of GP practices, pharmacies, optometrists and other community settings.

And therein lies both the opportunity and challenge.

Digital technology should help patients reach the right service first time, automate routine administration, enable better self-management and allow clinicians to concentrate their time on people with more complex needs. Used intelligently, it can support the other great shifts the government wants to achieve too: from hospital to community and from sickness to prevention.

But there is a danger that we confuse digitising access with transforming care.

Making it easier to contact the NHS is not necessarily the same thing as reducing pressure on it. If a new digital front door simply produces more follow-up work for already stretched primary-care teams, we have made demand more efficient without making the service more productive.

That distinction seems to me, as a former minister for primary care, to matter enormously.

The real opportunity is not simply to give patients a digital route to the same services they have always used. It is to use technology to change where they go and, sometimes, whether they need to see a healthcare professional at all.

During my tenure as the minister, Pharmacy First was born of exactly that thinking and I wrote about it in a recent column. It is hugely successful but that success should give us confidence to ask the next question: is Pharmacy First an analogue service in a digital age?

Its great strength is its simplicity. You have a problem, you walk into a pharmacy and speak to a professional, often without an appointment. We must not lose that.

But today we should be able to open the NHS App, describe our symptoms and be directed towards the right destination: self-care, GP, urgent care or community pharmacy. If pharmacy is appropriate, we should be able to see which pharmacies nearby offer the service and, ultimately, which have the capacity to see us.

‘Try your local pharmacy’ is mere signposting. ‘Your local pharmacy can help you this afternoon’ is a pathway.

The same principle applies much more widely.

A patient should not need to understand the organisational architecture of the NHS before accessing it. The question should increasingly be not how do I get a GP appointment? but what is the quickest and most appropriate way for the NHS to help me?

A genuinely intelligent digital front door should help make that distinction.

This is where the government’s digital ambitions and its neighbourhood health agenda ought to come together. Digital should be the connective tissue which allows care closer to home to work, not a separate technology programme running alongside it.

The NHS App may become increasingly sophisticated, but a brilliant consumer interface sitting on top of fragmented clinical systems does not constitute a digital health service. In short, the NHS does not only have a digital-access challenge; it has an integration challenge.

There is a workforce issue here also. Digital transformation cannot simply become another set of requirements imposed upon primary care. Every new platform, pathway or form of digital access changes somebody’s working day.

For a GP practice already managing intense demand, the compelling technology is not necessarily the one with the most impressive functionality. It is the one that removes duplication, reduces avoidable contacts, automates routine processes or releases clinical time.

Perhaps that suggests a simple test for every significant piece of NHS digital transformation should be; what workload does it REMOVE, not simply what functionality does it ADD?

There is an important patient dimension too. Digital by default cannot become digital only. Some patients will continue to need telephone or face-to-face access and, for those with frailty, multiple conditions or other complex needs, human navigation may become more rather than less important.

That is not an argument against digitalisation. In many ways, it is the argument for it. If technology can deal more effectively with straightforward transactions and help digitally confident patients navigate services themselves, scarce capacity can concentrate on those who need it most.

That, ultimately, is the prize.

Digital transformation should not be an IT programme imposed upon primary care. It should be service redesign undertaken WITH primary care. And the real measure of success will not be what happens on the screen, but whether technology changes for the better what happens behind it.