Category Archives: Education

Crunching the NEET numbers: Is the crisis worse than we think?

Youth unemployment has rarely been higher on the political agenda. The ‘NEET’ acronym, which applies to 16-24 year olds not in education, employment or training, has become a common feature of our political vernacular: ‘one million NEETs’ a phrase now all too familiar in conversations around skills, welfare and the future of work. Since January 2026, the term ‘NEETs’ has been mentioned more times in the House of Commons than in the entire period between 2020 and 2025. The subject is likely to face more scrutiny in the autumn, as the final, ‘solutions’ report of Alan Milburn’s review into young people and work is published.

What actually lies behind the one million figure? And what do the intricacies of the data mean for the future of the crisis, and for how we assess the government’s existing, and upcoming, policy interventions in the space?

The total number of 16-24-year-olds classified as NEET has risen from 740,000 in June 2022 to one million in March this year. Since the Milburn Review was commissioned in November last year, the estimated number of NEETs has risen by 50,000, and there is little sign that the increase is slowing. The latest estimates equate to 13.5% of the total 16 to 24 cohort, or close to one in seven of Britain’s young people.

The headline number only tells part of the story. Zooming in on the statistics tells us that the NEET crisis is not, as is perhaps commonly assumed, most acute among school or university leavers. Instead, it is among the eldest cohort of young people (23 to 24-year-olds) that the scale of the problem is most apparent, and where the long-term consequences of disengagement are arguably greatest.

The older the NEET, the deeper the problem

According to ONS data, 18 to 20-year-olds account for approximately 30% of the total NEET figure. The ‘NEET rate’, the percentage of young people within a given age group, among the entire 18-20 cohort across the country is relatively low (11.4%), and the overall number has undergone a decline in the last two years. The majority (56%) of these NEETs are classified as economically inactive (not working and not looking or able to do so) with the remainder unemployed.

Among 21 to 22-year-olds, the age at which many will leave university or further education, the NEET rate rises to 17%. The balance shifts ever so slightly to 43% that are unemployed and 57% economically inactive.

The final age group, 23 to 24-year-olds, is where the NEET picture becomes much starker. NEETs in this age group account for over a third of the one million total, and the figure is equivalent to a staggering 18.2% of the age cohort, almost one in five. More striking still is the composition of that group. Just 36% are unemployed, while 64% are economically inactive.

That inactivity figure will be a source of much consternation for policymakers. We know from Alan Milburn himself that once young people stop looking for work that ‘the route back is much harder.’ We also know that 45% of today’s 24-year-old NEETs have never had a job, and that those who have never worked by 24 are far more likely to struggle to find sustained employment for the rest of their lives – a long-term ‘scarring effect’ that follows young people into adulthood. The fact that the number of 25 to 49-year-olds unemployed for 12 months or more has risen from 151,000 in April-June 2025 to 198,000 in April-June 2026 may be an early sign of this reality showing up in the data, especially as today’s 25-year-old NEETs slip out of the 16-24 limelight.

Under the Labour government, there have been some attempts to intervene. Keir Starmer oversaw the launch of various initiatives under the Youth Guarantee banner. This include the Jobs Guarantee, offering government-funded six-month work placements for 18 to 24-year-olds on Universal Credit who have been looking for work for 18 months; and the Youth Jobs Grant, worth £3,000 to employers that hire a young person on UC who has been looking for work for six months or more. Together, these policies are expected to support 150,000 young people into jobs over the next three years.

Likewise, in recent weeks Andy Burnham has proposed introducing technical education qualifications for 14 to 16-year-olds in schools; a move billed as a way to boost skills development for young people and enhance their readiness for ‘the jobs of the future’, matched to local employer need, with positive knock-on effects for career options. This proposal, alongside commitments to devolve 16-19 funding powers to regional mayors, has been billed by the government as the ‘first step’ in the prime minister’s plan to tackle the youth unemployment crisis.

There are merits to both interventions but also limits. The Youth Guarantee schemes, for example, targets young people already visible through the benefits system, leaving the ‘hidden NEET’ population with little equivalent support (those who do not receive any welfare support from the government, estimated at around half of the total). Earlier exposure to technical education may help prevent young people becoming detached from work in the first place, and devolved powers mean more tailored local skills provision in some regions. However, the reforms will do little for the large cohort of older NEETs already sitting outside the labour market, with the implementation of these reforms not expected until at least two years down the line.

The findings and recommendations of the Milburn Review will need to be wholesale and ambitious if they are to make a meaningful dent in the NEET numbers. But they must also take account of where the biggest NEET challenge actually lies, among the eldest cohort. While policymakers often point out that ‘NEET does not begin at 16’, their future interventions must be equally guided by the truth at the opposite end of the spectrum that NEET does not end at 24. The current trajectory appears unsustainable. ONS figures this week, showing a further fall in job vacancies, suggest the crisis may well get worse before it gets any better.

 

GK Strategy are a sector-leading team of consultants with expertise and experience across the education and skills landscape. If you have questions about government policy in the space, or would like to discuss GK’s public affairs offering, please contact:

Scott Dodsworth – Managing Director at scott@gkstrategy.com.

Natty Croucher – Associate at natty@gkstrategy.com

What could skills policy look like under a Burnham-led government?

The prospect of Andy Burnham succeeding Keir Starmer as Prime Minister is significant for the skills sector. Burnham is a strong advocate for technical education and has criticised previous governments for their ‘obsession’ with higher education, including former Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair’s target of having more than 50% of young people go to university.

In his first major speech since launching his bid to replace Starmer on Monday 29 June, Burnham acknowledged that while university is ‘great for those who want it’, there also needs to be a focus on the life chances of those who don’t wish to opt for the higher education route. Given he has long called for ‘true parity’ between academic and technical education, as highlighted in his manifesto for his 2015 Labour leadership bid, Burnham is likely to place much greater emphasis on study programmes linked to in-demand technical and vocational occupations as part of a broader effort to create clearer pathways into employment for young people.

Burham’s Manchester Baccalaureate (MBacc), which provides a pathway into the region’s high growth sectors through technical and vocational qualifications, is a clear example of what this shift could look like on a national scale. Launched by the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) in September 2024, the MBacc guarantees every young person in the region a clear pathway to employment opportunities through a combination of careers advice services, work experience placements and technical qualifications, including by expanding access to T Levels and apprenticeships.

Since its launch in 2024-25, the MBacc has benefitted from growing support amongst local employers. In January 2026, GMCA confirmed that several leading employers, including Autotrader, IBM and the NHS, had pledged over 1,000 additional work placements to T Level students. This demonstrates how engaged and invested businesses can be in skills and the future workforce, provided the right policy framework is in place. The MBacc not only provides technical education routes into growing regional industries, but it also encourages young people to make subject choices at the ages of 14, 16 and 18 that support progression into these pathways.

Another aspect of Burnham’s approach is the emphasis he places on greater collaboration between skills, health and employment, specifically the need to adopt a place-based model while pivoting away from a nationally directed skills system. One of the advantages of a place-based model is the recognition of significant regional differences in the causes of unemployment and the nature of local labour markets. This includes inconsistent access to training provision and the variety of opportunities for growth across the country. A Burnham-led government is likely therefore to see more devolution by default, whereby employment support is further integrated with local health, skills and community services. This would mean that providers in the FE and HE sectors play a much larger role in supporting people into work.

A Burnham premiership is likely to see a more devolved and technically-focused skills and training system. On a practical level, this is likely to involve granting established combined mayoral authorities (like London, Greater Manchester and the West Midlands) greater autonomy in shaping skills provision around local labour market demands. For employers and training providers, this direction of travel will place greater emphasis on more joined-up local working and support across education, health and employment services. While this has the potential to significantly transform the skills sector, the test for Burnham is whether he can demonstrate that a localised, devolved approach will deliver economic growth, boost living standards, and give every young person growing up a ‘clear path into a re-industrialised Britain’.

If you would like to talk more the potential of a Burnham-led government and what this could mean for the skills sector, please email Noureen@gkstrategy.com.

EU Youth Mobility Scheme: Brexit divisions and the Burnham factor

GK’s Brett Morton examines the ongoing negotiations with the EU on a youth mobility scheme and what it means for the future of the UK-EU relationship

A youth mobility agreement has become a central component of the Labour government’s drive to improve UK-EU relations. Although both sides broadly support the principle of making it easier for young people to live, work and study across borders, the parties remain divided over the terms. Points of contention over immigration caps and tuition fees risk preventing a wider package of UK-EU cooperation measures. Both sides had been keen to secure these at a second bilateral summit scheduled for 22 July in Brussels. The summit has now been delayed following the Prime Minister’s resignation.

The scheme under discussion would allow 18-30-year-olds from the UK and EU to spend a limited period living, studying and working in each other’s countries. In broad terms, it would resemble the agreement the UK already has with countries such as Australia and Canada. Under those arrangements, young people can come to Britain for up to three years, subject to visa rules and annual caps, and work, travel or study without employer sponsorship. The UK would like any deal with the EU to follow the same basic model: temporary, managed and clearly distinct from free movement.

That distinction matters because immigration remains one of the most politically charged legacies of Brexit. Opponents of the proposal, including Nigel Farage, argue that such a scheme would amount to freedom of movement under a different name. Ministers have been keen to stress that any agreement with the EU would be time-limited and capped. Reports suggest the Starmer government favoured a ceiling of 50,000 participants a year. The EU, by contrast, is believed to prefer a more flexible arrangement, with no fixed cap but a break mechanism that would allow either side to intervene if numbers became excessive. For the next Prime Minister, accepting a scheme without a visible numerical limit would be politically difficult, particularly given the public’s appetite to reduce net migration.

Since Brexit, labour shortages have become a persistent problem in sectors such as hospitality, agriculture and construction. At present, a young EU citizen who wants to work in the UK for a limited period usually needs sponsorship from a British employer. In practice, that system is often costly, bureaucratic and tied to salary thresholds that many small businesses cannot meet. In many cases, sponsorship requires employers to offer a salary of at least £41,700 a year, or the going rate for the role, which places it out of reach for much seasonal, temporary and lower-paid work. Supporters of a youth mobility scheme argue that without the need for sponsorship or salary thresholds, it could widen the pool of labour and make it easier to fill temporary or seasonal vacancies. Even so, its impact would be limited, as it may ease pressure in high-turnover sectors but would do far less to address longer-term shortages in fields that depend on permanent skilled workers, such as healthcare or technology.

A major obstacle to a youth mobility agreement is tuition fees. The EU wants students to study in the UK and EU countries on the same basis as domestic students, meaning EU students at UK universities would pay home fees rather than higher international rates. With 24 institutions reportedly at risk of insolvency within the next year, according to the Education Select Committee, international student fees have become a vital source of income. The Russel Group, an association of 24 prestigious universities in the UK, has warned that granting EU students home fee status could cost the sector around £580 million, reducing universities’ ability to invest in programmes such as Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe.

The youth mobility debate must also be understood in its wider political context. Starmer had originally hoped that a UK-EU reset would help revive his premiership by showing that closer cooperation with Europe could deliver practical benefits, from smoother trade to lower costs for consumers. With his resignation, that personal political purpose has fallen away. Future negotiations are no longer about rescuing his administration, but about shaping the direction of the next Prime Minister’s agenda.

With an Andy Burnham coronation now increasingly likely ahead of 22 July, the EU has postponed the summit. A youth mobility scheme could offer Burnham an opportunity to pursue economic and social reforms in response to what he has described as the ‘damage’ caused by Brexit. However, Burnham is also likely to be cautious about making significant concessions to Brussels, particularly on a cap, as he seeks to appeal to Reform UK voters and avoid reopening divisions from the Brexit referendum ahead of a potential 2029 general election. The future of any youth mobility scheme with the EU will therefore depend on Burnham’s political calculus.