Tag Archives: defence

Key Takeaways from the Spending Review: A future that is less generous than the past

GK had the pleasure of hosting former Treasury and education minister David Laws and the Financial Times’ Economics Commentator Chris Giles in our latest webinar on Thursday (12th June) to discuss the winners and losers from the government’s spending review, and what it means for business.

The spending review is a significant moment in the political calendar. The settlements it confirms set departmental day-to-day budgets for the next three years (2026-27, 2027-28 and 2028-29) and capital expenditure for the next four (until 2029-30). It is also the moment when No.10 and the Treasury must publicly commit the funds to support their political objectives – in essence, we get to see where spending is going to be prioritised and where it is not.

In the webinar, David and Chris detailed what the spending review means for overall public spending, where the government could come undone, and the possibility of future tax rises. You can read a summary of their key takeaways below:

The spending review is not about making new money available or introducing new taxes. Spending reviews are all about the allocation of a pre-determined spending envelope which, in this instance, the Chancellor set out in the October budget last year. It does not introduce any new taxes or make new money available. Instead, it confirms what areas of public spending the government wants to prioritise, and which departments will have to be squeezed.

The departmental settlements do not represent a return to the austerity years. While the overall spending envelope is tight – especially given growing pressure on public spending across health, pensions and defence – day-to-day spending is still rising by 1.2% per year in real terms (i.e. accounting for inflation) over the spending review period. This means it is broadly in line with the departmental spending settlements put forward by various governments since 2019.

A lot of the spending assumptions depend on public sector productivity improving, which is no guarantee. Public sector productivity has declined since the Covid-19 pandemic and in 2024 it fell by 0.3%. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) has historically assumed quite generous improvements in public sector productivity each year which is a key component of its overall economic growth metric.

If the OBR significantly revises down its assumptions about improvements in productivity, this could seriously impact the funds it is projecting the government will have to work with over the spending review period. This increases the likelihood of the government having to do introduce large tax rises at the autumn budget.

Defence will continue to put pressure on the government’s overall spending envelope. Since the end of the Second World War, successive governments have used cuts to defence as a means of boosting other areas of public spending, most notably health. Persistent global instability and geopolitical uncertainty means that higher levels of defence spending are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. No.10 and the Treasury will have to contend with this new spending pressure as demographic challenges continue to pile up and economic growth remains sluggish.

The NHS is the big winner from the spending review, albeit with a smaller settlement than it has historically received. Health secretary Wes Streeting will undoubtedly be the happiest around the Cabinet table following the confirmation of the Department of Health and Social Care’s settlement, with spending on the NHS set to grow by 3% per year in real terms. However, this is below historic average rises of approximately 4-5%. With a growing elderly population and people living with complex conditions for longer, the funding put forward in the spending review settlement is unlikely to significantly move the dial on the performance of the NHS.

Small tax rises are likely at the autumn budget to meet the Chancellor’s fiscal rules. The government has committed to meet day-to-day expenditure through its own revenues by 2029-30. This means its current budget will have to be in balance or surplus by the end of the decade, and any money the government does borrow will be to invest. If the OBR projects that the government is not on course to meet this fiscal rule (or any of its others), then Chancellor Rachel Reeves will be forced to come back for a second round of tax rises or decide to break a fiscal rule. Either look fairly unpalatable to the government given where they currently are in the opinion polls.

A cabinet reshuffle should be expected in the second half of 2026 as the government begins to ramp up to the next general election. 2026 is projected to a big election year in the UK. Elections are due to take place for the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, along with a series of newly created unitary authorities. Should the results prove poor for Labour, as current polling indicates they will, then Prime Minister Keir Starmer is likely to reshuffle his cabinet to get his top team in place as the No.10 machine starts to think about the next general election in 2029.

Will Trump derail Starmer’s policy plans?

GK Associate Josh Owolabi shares his thoughts on the impact of a second Trump presidency on the government’s policy agenda.

Messaging from the Starmer government since Trump’s election victory has focused on projecting calmness. The government believes that it has done its ‘homework’ on Trump and that both countries will prosper while Trump is in office. However, Trump’s unpredictability was a key characteristic of his first presidency. His penchant for breaking – or threatening to break – norms is well established and will induce anxiety within Downing Street. Trump does not do ‘orthodox’ and, in contrast to his first term, now has the full support of the Republican Party to make radical policy changes that could impact the UK economy and the Starmer government’s delivery of its policy agenda.

Trump’s view on the use of tariffs symbolises his unorthodox approach. He has proposed a 60% tariff on imports from China and up to 20% on goods imported from other countries as part of his ‘America First’ strategy. Economists and research institutes across the United States have criticised the plan, arguing that it is counterproductive as it would make goods more expensive for American consumers. This would also be problematic for the Starmer government as the US is the biggest market for high value goods from the UK, including pharmaceuticals, automotive parts, and medical products, and would likely impact pricing for goods in these industries.

The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) has argued that the imposition of even a 10% tariff would be damaging for the UK, reducing GDP growth by 0.7% in 2025. Given the fiscal climate, the government can ill-afford a reduction in growth if it plans to deliver on its pledges to improve access to healthcare and education (including a major expansion of early years entitlement in 2025).

Although Trump’s ‘trade war’ rhetoric is focused on China and the EU which could mean avoiding the full 20% tariff on exported goods, the UK is unlikely to receive special treatment. While Trump spoke of a UK-US trade deal during his first term, which would likely remove any tariffs, it is unrealistic to expect progress on a deal any time soon. The US has demanded the lowering of regulatory standards on American agricultural imports, such as ‘chlorinated chicken’, which has been a red line for previous governments.

The Starmer government is unlikely to budge on this issue given that the public does not support the lowering of food standards to secure a trade deal. Stephen Moore, a former economic adviser to Trump, has said that the UK must embrace the US economic model and move away from Europe’s “socialist” system, if it wants to agree a trade deal with the US. The Prime Minister has categorically rejected this view. During a speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, he argued that his government does not need to choose between the US or the EU. Instead, Keir Starmer plans to forge closer economic ties with both. However, implementing this strategy will be incredibly difficult if Trump picks a fight with the EU and demands that trade with China is reduced.

Trump’s isolationist instincts will also cause concern. The government’s pledge to raise defence spending to 2.5% of GDP to support the Ukrainian war effort will therefore come under heavy scrutiny. Trump has long expressed frustration with the US’ allies for allowing their defence spending to fall after the Cold War ended, feeling that the US has been left to pick up the bill. Will the new Trump administration be satisfied that the UK is committed to reducing the overreliance on the United States? If not, the Starmer government may need to prioritise defence spending which would limit the government’s room to manoeuvre as it has just raised taxes by £40bn and still remains only just within its fiscal rules. Increased defence spending will make it harder for the government to spend more elsewhere, and get ailing public services back ‘on track’ or make investments that help it to grow the economy.

Helicopter over the dessert

Will Sunak’s Latest Reset Work?

GK Associate Hugo Tuckett examines the Prime Minister’s recent speech at Policy Exchange and whether he can address the Conservative Party’s declining fortunes.

Rishi Sunak turns his attention to security in bid to tackle Labour’s poll lead.

Following a dismal set of local election results and the high-profile defection of Dover MP Natalie Elphicke to Labour, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has attempted to reset the political agenda. He used his latest relaunch at Policy Exchange, a Conservative-friendly think tank, to portray himself as the best leader to guide the country through what he described as the “dangerous and transformational” years ahead.

References were made throughout to ensuring the UK’s security in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. It was also telling that Sunak made a pitch to voters on the opportunities presented by artificial intelligence – an area where he will feel comfortable promoting his tech credentials against the Labour leader Keir Starmer, who is 17 years his senior.

It is not unusual for incumbent (and unpopular) governments to paint opposition parties as inexperienced and incapable at a time of potential national peril. Former Prime Minister Gordon Brown famously argued “this is no time for a novice” in the wake of the 2008 financial crash amid David Cameron’s growing popularity. However, to go for this tactic right at the start of a general election campaign does suggest Sunak’s No.10 operation is running out of levers to pull to tackle Starmer’s seemingly unassailable lead in the polls.

Sunak’s pivot into security marks a clear distinction from his previous attempts to put the Conservatives on the path to election victory. At the 2023 Conservative Party Conference, he tried to paint himself as the change candidate and separate himself from the then 13 years of Conservative rule. Sunak was subsequently forced to adopt a continuity-focused strategy and defend the Conservatives’ record in office following David Cameron’s return as Foreign Secretary later that year.

The extent to which Sunak’s latest reset will work will depend on whether the electorate is still listening. The Conservative Party can highlight its commitment to raise defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2030, a pledge yet to be matched by Labour, who have adopted the looser definition of meeting the 2.5% figure “as soon as resources allow.” However, with Labour so far ahead in the polls and three changes of tack in less than a year, it does raise the prospect that the Prime Minister is trying to engage an electorate which is simply no longer interested in what the Conservatives have to offer.

Helicopters

Underfunded & Underprepared: Is Britain’s Defence Broken?

GK Adviser Felix Griffin dives into the challenges facing the MoD, from funding shortfalls to sluggish decision-making, and explores potential paths forward.

Incoherent strategy and a lack of funding is hampering progress

The UK’s Ministry of Defence finds itself grappling with a yawning funding gap, a rapidly evolving global landscape demanding a more responsive military, and an uncertain political landscape.

The biggest hurdle? Money – not just the lack of it but also how its spent.

Having fallen down the pecking order in the Chancellor’s recent budget, defence spending is set to receive no additional funding under the current government’s remaining tenure.

Meanwhile rising costs, particularly in nuclear deterrence and ambitious naval programmes, have created a staggering £16.9 billion hole in the MoD’s Equipment Plan – a shortfall which effectively handcuffs the MoD’s ability to modernise its equipment and carry out crucial projects necessary to maintain a robust defence posture.

There’s more to this than just money. Recent warnings highlight long-standing and systemic inventory failures in all three categories of inventory across the UK armed forces: Capital Spares, Raw Material and Consumables, and Guided Weapons, Missiles and Bombs. This raises a critical question: even with increased funding, would the UK be able to effectively equip its armed forces? The current evidence suggests not, presenting a deeper problem that needs addressing.

These issues point not only to a lack of innovation in procurement and strategic thinking, but also to sluggish decision-making processes that hinder the MoD’s ability to react swiftly to emerging threats.

Defence Secretary Grant Shapps’s stark assessment of the current situation – a transition from a “post-war world into a pre-war world” – rings all too true. The war in Ukraine serves as a stark reminder of the impact of large-scale conflict in Europe, while regional instability in the Middle East and the ever-growing tensions in the Asia-Pacific all demand a more agile and capable military from the UK. These diverse threats, which are by no means an exhaustive list, require a comprehensive and adaptable defence strategy from the MoD; something which the most recent Integrated Review (2021) failed to deliver, even after it was refreshed in 2023.

With the possibility of a new Labour government becoming increasingly likely, the party’s stance on defence policy and spending adds another layer of uncertainty.

I attended a Policy Exchange event on 28 February, which saw Labour’s Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, John Healey, articulate his party’s vision for national defence. While recognising outdated practices and the imperative to modernise, Labour’s defence plans appear largely underdeveloped, or at least under-communicated.

Despite outlining some interesting plans, including a new national armaments director and the enhancement of the Chief of Defence Staff’s role, Healey’s speech fell victim to his party’s commitment to fiscal prudence, lacking significant substance and ambition. Though highlighting the state of defence when Labour left in 2010, with comparatively higher levels of defence spending (2.5% of GDP), as well as better troop numbers and satisfaction (over 100,000 soldiers and 60% approval), Healey emphasised the need to streamline existing processes before making financial commitments, underscoring a cautious approach. Nevertheless, Labour’s emphasis on reform and strategic preparedness offers a glimpse into their aspirations for bolstering the nation’s security in an increasingly uncertain world.

Silouhette of soldier

Artificial Intelligence: ‘The Future of Defence Capability’