Category Archives: Tech

Labour’s new era for agriculture: Can political stability drive agri-tech innovation?

GK Senior Adviser James Allan analyses the government’s agriculture policy plans and the opportunities that could arise for investors.

With the Labour government now in power, some may wonder if the food, farming and agriculture sectors are about to see a major shift – a shift from being an important constituent of the then Conservative administration of 14 years to lower down the political list of priorities within Labour’s “mission led” government.

The Autumn Budget on 30 October will partly address this concern and end the speculation about potential changes to agriculture property relief and Defra’s agricultural budget. But with a Party of a different political hue now occupying the corridors of power, it’s worth considering whether Labour’s pro-growth messaging of “political stability” to attract private sector investment extends to the food, farming and agriculture (FFA) sectors, and if so, to what extent.

Why Labour must harvest more than just political stability

To attract private investment, ‘political stability’ alone is not sufficient – it needs to be backed up by policy substance and public investment, and with long-term strategic thinking. From aquaculture to viticulture, solar farms to biodiversity, food pricing and standards to foods high in fat, salt and sugar, there are many agendas and issues at play. These will all be playing out against a political backdrop with a renewed sense of momentum, a government with a greater willingness to intervene in the name of public health, an entire mission focused on decarbonisation, and a tight fiscal environment impacting the potential for significant public investment.

The first 100 days for the new government have proved that governing isn’t easy. Political pinch points and missteps aside, a common thread in the criticisms levelled against Labour ministers has been the absence of a defining vision for the sector to provide the framework for policy thinking and development; not least for food security which is set to become one of the defining political issues of the parliament. Without this overarching vision for the sector, the ability for businesses to plan their own investment and growth strategies becomes much more difficult and limits the ability of government to ‘crowd in’ private capital to drive growth.

The sowing of early seeds positive for UK investors

There are a few positive and recent developments of note. First, the Farming Minister, Daniel Zeichner, has confirmed the government’s intention to introduce secondary legislation which will bring to reality the regulatory regime of the Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Act 2023.[1] This will help to simplify the authorisation process for bringing new products to market from 1o years to an estimated 12 months.[2] Investors should note the government’s familiar caveat of “as soon as parliamentary time allows” which means the introduction of secondary legislation is unlikely to be imminent and will compete with an already packed legislative calendar. Speeding up routes to market will be welcomed by investors backing early-stage or growth-stage companies involved in gene editing, crop efficiency technologies, or those innovating in climate-resistant crop varieties. The streamlined regulatory environment lowers barriers, creating the potential for significant returns more quickly. Zeichner has also confirmed 43,000 Seasonal Worker visas for the horticulture sector and 2,000 for the poultry sector for 2025. Accompanied by a few additional measures to simplify free-range labelling requirements, this signals that the Defra ministerial team is actively listening to the sector and willing to flex policy to meet operational challenges and remove barriers to growth.[3]

Secondly, the government has secured access to the US market for British beetroot farmers, boosting export opportunities and attributed to the efforts of DEFRA’s agri-food attaché in the US.[4] This establishes an interesting precedent for securing market access outside of more formal and comprehensive free trade agreements, and creates attractive investment opportunities in companies that produce export-ready, high-quality British agricultural goods. Crucially, produce by produce access deals averts the political tightrope of negotiating comprehensive trade deals, not least one with the US which has long been the envy of previous Conservative Prime Ministers. For investors and argi-businesses on the lookout for export opportunities, engaging with DEFRA’s eleven attaches located in British embassies and consulates in Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Kenya, The Gulf, India, Japan, China, Thailand and Vietnam will be important to replicate this success.

Thirdly, there is recognition in government of the long and fraught dissatisfaction among farmers concerning the future viability of the agricultural sector.[5] The Labour ministerial team perceives a lack of confidence among farmers as the rationale for needing to optimise Environmental Land Management schemes as part of a wider new deal for farmers. The precise details of this new deal have yet to be clarified but the government has signalled a focus on:

Trade deals undercutting low welfare and low standards
Maximising public sector purchasing power to back British produce
A land-use framework to balance nature recovery and long-term food security

A latter focus on food security will be important for investors seeking opportunities which align with Labour’s aim to make the UK more self-reliant in the food and energy sectors, but especially where technological innovation contributes to more efficient and resilient farming processes and produce. Defending their record in government and playing in safe political territory, this was a focus of a recent opposition day debate in Parliament where several Conservative MPs made the case for greater public investment in new farming technologies to safeguard the nation’s food supply.[6] However, as noted by DEFRA Secretary, Steve Reed, the government’s ability to do so is up for consideration in the upcoming Budget and next year’s Spending Review and therefore competes with other public spending priorities.

A wet start for the farming sector

This year’s harvest of the five key crops – wheat, winter and spring barley, oats and oilseed rape – saw a decrease of 15% compared to the 2023 harvest with an estimated loss of £600m in revenue for English farmers due to considerable wet weather.[7] The impact has extended beyond these core crops with a south Devonshire winemaker reporting a 70% decrease in expected volumes compared to 2023 and another winemaker noting heightened disease pressures due to constant rain. For the British viticulture industry, the wet weather year of 2024 follows a boom in capital investment and overseas wine producers buying into the UK as a hedge against climate change. Rural and farming communities might not be this government’s traditional supporter base but neglecting the sector – with its sub-sector growth gems like viticulture – risks undermining long-term food security and economic growth not just farmers but the broader economy and consumers alike.

[1] DEFRA, New legislation to support precision breeding and boost Britain’s food security (Sept-23 link)

[2] DEFRA, Impact Assessment – Impact Assessment – Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Bill (Mar-22 link)

[3] DEFRA, Government provides certainty to horticulture and poultry businesses (Oct-24 link)

[4] DEFRA, British beetroot growers to put down roots in US market (Sept-24 link)

[5] DEFRA, Government to restore stability for farmers as confidence amongst sector low (Aug-24 link)

[6] House of Commons, Opposition day debate on farming and food security (Oct-24 link)

[7] Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit, England has second worst harvest on record with fears mounting for 2025 (Oct-24 link)

Artificial Intelligence: ‘The Future of Defence Capability’

GK Senior Adviser Robert Blackmore assesses how world leaders will increasingly need to consider the implications of incorporating AI as part of their defensive capabilities, and looks ahead to this week’s summit on the governance of artificial intelligence.

This week Bletchley Park will host a global summit on safety and Artificial Intelligence. For the first time, world leaders, AI companies and researchers will come together to discuss the opportunities and risks surrounding the development of the most revolutionary technology since the discovery of nuclear fusion. The summit aims to initiate the development of a global consensus on AI governance.

Whereas much of the initial focus on the purpose of nuclear technology had military connotations, experts today highlight the impact AI may have on every aspect of our lives. Bletchley Park will therefore host discussions on a wide range of potential over-arching implications of AI. However, with an historic rise in global deaths by conflict reported by the Institute for Economics and Peace, not least following Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the latest outbreak of violence in the Middle East, it is important to consider the role of AI and defence in isolation.

Earlier this year, Lord Sedwill, the former National Security Adviser, suggested to the House of Lords Select Committee on AI in Weapons Systems that AI was “the future of defence capability”. While he assured Peers that such a development would not equate to “Terminator” or “Matrix” style killer robots – a view that is not universal – the implication was clear: developments in AI have the potential to have dramatic ramifications for the defence sector, and in turn, the future of warfare.

This has not been lost on the world leaders. In 2018, rather ominously, the United States warned: ‘Our adversaries and competitors are aggressively working to define the future of these powerful technologies according to their interests, values, and societal models. Their investments threaten to erode U.S. military advantage, destabilize the free and open international order, and challenge our values and traditions with respect to human rights and individual liberties.’

In response, the Pentagon published an AI Strategy that sought to transform the ‘speed and agility’ of US military operations and identified several potential benefits of AI, including improving situational awareness and reduce collateral damage. Meanwhile, in 2022, the UK Ministry of Defence outlined its ‘Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy’, highlighting its ambition for the UK Armed Forces to be the world’s most ‘effective, efficient, trusted and influential Defence organisation’ for its size.

Nor has the potential of AI been lost on the defence industry. This year defence contractor Leidos formed a strategic partnership with tech giant Microsoft, while Lockhead Martin has invested multi millions in AI technology and established and ‘AI factory’, as reported by Forbes, to ‘streamline access of its software writers to the resources they need for generating AI applications’.

AI already plays a crucial role in military operations. For example, it is being used by the Ukrainian military to rapidly review satellite images and video feeds from drones. Crucially, in this scenario AI acts a vital supporting tool for military operators to make decisions. Ultimately, final output remains the preserve of human, as opposed to artificial, intelligence.

This is the crux of the matter. As AI’s capabilities increase, how much agency should it be given to act according to the set of instructions established by its human handler? Can we trust a weapon acting autonomously not to make catastrophic errors in the context of life and death scenarios? Once you remove human oversight from weaponry, you are left with Automated Weapons Systems (AWS), loosely defined as systems that can select and attack a target without human intervention.

The closest such weapon in existence is believed to be STM’s Kargu-2 drone. It has been deployed by the Turkish, and reportedly Azerbaijan, armed forces. Unsurprisingly, there are significant ethical concerns about the further development of such weapons. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has argued AWS risk escalating conflicts in an unpredictable manner and thus potentially aggravating humanitarian needs, while Amnesty International claim such machines would automate killing, treat it as a technical undertaking, and refrain from making life and death decisions with any empathy or compassion.

As it stands, there are no formal international rules governing the use of AI in a military context. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has called for a legally binding instrument to prohibit lethal autonomous weapon systems without human oversight by 2026. While in February, 33 Latin American and Caribbean States called for the urgent negotiation of a legally binding international treaty on autonomy in weapons systems that will guarantee human oversight. As recently as October, Pakistan’s representative to the United Nations’ First Committee on Disarmament and International Security stated that “We are at the verge of a monumental step in human technological history, heralded by the advent of artificial intelligence”, warning that there were insufficient guardrails governing the ‘design, development and deployment’ of AWS.

However, the obstacles that the creation of an international agreement would face are stern. Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, during a hearing of the House of Lords AI in Weapons Systems Select Committee in May, told Peers that the speed at which AWS technology is developing would inevitably outpace any negotiation of such treaty. Furthermore, for it to have purpose, it would require agreement in good faith between adversaries. Negotiations over nuclear disarmament between the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, culminating in the much-heralded 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), has shown that this is possible. However, the necessary geopolitical conditions must be in place, as they where in the late 1980’s between the two global superpowers. It is for this reason, this week’s AI Safety Summit could be so crucial, even if it is not directly dealing with the use of artificial intelligence in a combat setting. For China, despite its soaring tensions with several countries present, not least the United States, will reportedly play a key role at the summit. A delegation from the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology will be in attendance. While, the Telegraph suggests that Professor Yi Zeng, a leading academic at the CCP-controlled Chinese Academy of Sciences, will chair a behind-closed-doors session focusing on the risk that AI mechanisms may “unexpectedly develop dangerous capabilities”. It would be a great surprise if AI in the context of warfare was left unmentioned.

Therefore, at a time when the geopolitical stakes are so high, the AI Safety Summit has the potential to establish a common cause in relation to the governance of AI. This could perhaps lay the foundations for a pathway, however embryonic, towards an international guardrail in relation to Automated Weapons Systems.

The Draft Media Bill: A wolf in sheep’s clothing?

GK Consultant and resident specialist on digital policy, Robert Blackmore, takes a look at the recently published Draft Media Bill, and discusses one of the Bill’s most controversial aspects.

Little fanfare met the long-awaited publication of the Media Bill during the early hours of March 29^th. This was perhaps not a surprise – it was, after all, published in draft form. Furthermore, the Government’s previously publicised decision to U-turn on its highly contentious proposal to privatise Channel 4 certainly took the ‘sting’ out of its release.

However, the importance of the legislation cannot be understated, and nor should the potential for it to become another front in the Government’s delicate attempt to balance freedom of expression with the ‘safety’ of its citizens.

But first, why is the Government proposing an update to media law?

The draft bill represents the Government’s understandable desire to refresh the rules that govern a broadcasting landscape that has altered dramatically since New Labour’s 2003 Communications Act.

Back in 2003, notwithstanding the ascendancy of Sky Television and its monopoly over coverage of the Premier League, the linear model of television consumption still dominated, and few questioned the prominence of the Public Sector Broadcasters (PSB), namely, the BBC, ITV, STV, S4C, Channel 4 and Channel 5. Ofcom define these broadcasters as those that deliver “impartial and trusted news, UK-originated programmes and distinctive content.”

Two decades on and the market has been transformed. 75% of households use online Video-on-Demand (VOD) platforms, such as Disney+ and Netflix, with few viewers limiting their media habits only to linear television channels. This, combined with the consolidation of the global broadcasting market by global media entities in recent years, has raised questions regarding whether PSBs are so “prominent” after all.

The draft bill proposes several solutions to the so called ‘crowding-out’ of PSBs. Some are relatively minor, such as compelling set-top boxes and streaming sticks to provide PSB VOD services with priority in terms of discoverability, while others more substantial, like allowing online programmes to count towards PSBs meeting their public service remit.

However, one proposal has proven particularly contentious and far-reaching.

With echoes of the Government’s attempt to reign in ‘global big tech’ through the Online Safety Bill, written into the draft Media Bill is an extension of Ofcom’s remit that would grant it regulatory oversight of global (‘Tier One’) VOD platforms with a UK customer base, likely to include the likes of Netflix and Amazon.

This would take the form of a new code of practice that would seek to protect audiences from ‘harmful content’ and place impartiality requirements on non-news programmes. Indeed, for the first time, a UK viewer would be able to file a complaint against a non-PSB VOD platforms, which if upheld, could lead to Ofcom issuing fines of up to £250,000.

For global VOD platforms that operate in the UK, such a proposal is an unwelcome development, and an example of what they would describe as ‘government overreach’.

At a recent Westminster Forum event, Benjamin King, UK and Ireland director of public policy at Netflix, stated this proposal could have a “chilling effect” on the provision of its service, and undermined “freedom of expression”. He cited that it would significantly undermine “Netflix’s appetite to make available our many documentaries, which are so beloved by UK members”. He also called for legislators to carefully reflect on attempts to transpose UK regulations across international content.

Mr King will have welcomed, therefore, that the publication of the Bill was in draft form. This (relatively unusual) step allows the Bill’s text to receive pre-legislative scrutiny, and a potential re-drafting, prior to its formal introduction to Parliament.

Legislators are not naïve to the concerns of global VOD platforms. The Culture, Media and Sport (CMS) Committee immediately launched an inquiry into the draft bill in April. Amongst the questions the Committee highlighted in its terms of reference was: “Do the proposals in the draft Media Bill create any risks to UK’s desirability as a market for VoD content?” Interested parties have been granted the opportunity to feed into the inquiry via written evidence that will support the Committee in their scrutiny of the draft bill.

For their part, PSBs have broadly welcomed the proposals, with ITV crediting the draft Bill for providing them with the confidence to apply for a 10-year renewal to its PSB licence. However, they are also impatient for the Government to allocate parliamentary time to the Bill.

So what are the next steps for the draft Bill?

While it is believed that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport is very keen for the Bill to be formally introduced in the 4^th (and final) session of this Parliament, the legislative timetable is already highly concentrated. Indeed, if following the pre-legislative scrutiny the Government decides that major changes to the draft Bill are necessary, publication this side of an election (expected in 2024) could, ultimately, prove difficult.