Author Archives: GK Strategy

What impact will data centres have on the UK’s ability to meet its net zero ambitions?

Data centres have been subject to significant scrutiny in recent years, particularly in relation to their impact on the government’s net zero agenda. In correspondence sent to the cross-party Environmental Audit Committee on 20 February 2026, the Secretary of State for Energy, Security and Net Zero Ed Miliband admitted that energy future demand from data centres, and its interaction with the UK’s net zero ambitions, remains ‘inherently uncertain’.

The government has designated data centres as ‘critical national infrastructure’ given they support nearly all economic activities as well as the day-to-day running of public services. Forecasts undertaken by trade association TechUK suggest that data centres have the potential to contribute an additional £44 billion to the UK economy by 2035, highlighting their strategic importance to the government’s economic growth agenda. The government recognises the important role data centres will play in our economy, evidenced through its commitment to deliver nearly 100 new centres over the next five years. Nonetheless, this has led to environmental groups seeking clarity from the government on how it will deliver this ambition while meeting its environmental obligations.

Under plans to expand the number of data centres, policy challenges have been raised by the wider energy sector and industry bodies, particularly around their use of energy and water. In March 2022, the National Grid Electricity System Operator (ESO) estimated that data centres consume around 2.5% of the UK’s electricity. It is likely that data centres’ electricity consumption will increase significantly over the coming years. Forecasts published by Oxford Economics in December 2025 estimate that data centres’ demand will represent 30.4% of UK’s commercial electricity consumption by 2030.

Alongside rising demand for electricity to power data centres, there is widespread debate about their impact on the water sector. In a report published by the government’s Digital Sustainability Alliance’s (GDSA) in September 2025, global water usage is predicted to increase from 1.1bn cubic metres to 6.6bn cubic metres by 2027. There is limited data available on how much water data centres use given there is currently no obligation for centres to report their water consumption. It is unsurprising therefore, that there are a range of opinions around this issue. While trade associations like TechUK challenge the notion that data centres are ‘inherently water intensive’, non-profit organisations such as Global Action Plan, have criticised the sector’s lack of transparency.

Despite the uncertainty of the sector’s capacity to support the government’s net zero ambitions, there is appetite, particularly from parliamentarians, to better understand the environmental impact of data centres. Last month, the Environmental Audit Committee launched its own inquiry into the risks and opportunities of data centres in the UK, with the committee inviting submissions from interested parties until 6 April 2026. Parliamentarians have also launched a new All-Party Parliamentary Group  to examine the impact of data centres on economic growth and the UK’s net zero ambitions.

As an essential infrastructure for digital storage and the wider economy, there is potential for data centres to help facilitate rapid economic growth for the UK. While data centres are starting to come under scrutiny from parliamentarians regarding their impact on the environment, there is scope for the sector to engage with government which will be very much in listening mode. The government acknowledges the value of data centres but in order for businesses operating in this sector to succeed, the sector will need to challenge the notion that it will constrain the government’s environmental agenda.

If you would like to discuss the impact of data centres and the government’s net zero agenda in more detail, please reach out to Noureen Ahmed at Noureen@gkstrategy.com.

Portrait of Stephen Brine - Uk Parliament Official

The Rare Diseases Action Plan: A refreshing focus on implementation

GK Strategic Adviser and former health minister Steve Brine examines the government’s new Rare Diseases Action Plan and its impact on people living with rare diseases. 

As someone who has spent many years engaged with health policy, both inside and outside government, I was genuinely heartened to see the England’s Rare Diseases Action Plan published to mark Rare Disease Day last month.

This fifth annual plan builds on the UK Rare Diseases Framework and sets out clearly how we intend to turn the strategic priorities I first produced as the minister into real improvements in people’s lives.

Rare diseases may, individually and as the name suggest, be uncommon – but collectively they affect a significant number of people – and even more indirectly via family members.

I have always been acutely aware how too many families face what is heartbreakingly called a ‘diagnostic odyssey’; years of uncertainty, multiple referrals, and repeated explanations before a condition is recognised and understood.

This isn’t just about medicine; it’s about dignity, continuity of care, and basic fairness across the NHS.

The new 2026 Action Plan wisely positions itself as a practical implementation of the Rare Diseases Framework’s four core priorities:

  • helping patients get a final diagnosis faster
  • increasing awareness of rare diseases among healthcare professionals
  • better coordination of care; and
  • improving access to specialist care, treatment and drugs.

But it does much more than repeat them, it brings them to life in the context of the Government’s 10 Year Plan for the NHS in England.

At its core, the plan seeks to show how system-wide reform – from digital transformation to community-based care – can make a real difference for people living with rare conditions.

One of the most meaningful aspects of this year’s plan is its emphasis on health equity, something ministers often say is central to their health mission.

For too long, people living with rare diseases have experienced variation in the care they receive, depending on where they live or what their condition is.

This is not unique to this cohort of patients of course but, for the first time in an action plan of this kind, the system explicitly recognises rare disease as a health inequality, and commits to addressing this through better data, targeted improvement work, and integration with NHS England’s longstanding approach to tackling inequalities.

This marks an important shift – one that sits right at the heart of a modern health service, and was important to me when drawing together the original priorities.

On the diagnostic front, progress is evident but needs to go further and faster.

The NHS Genomic Medicine Service now delivers genomic testing for more than 7,000 rare conditions, and there’s a renewed focus on significantly shortening that ‘odyssey’.

The re-procurement of the NHS Genomic Medicine Service (GMS) from April 2026 is welcome as is the suggestion, something I wish I had been able to do, the new contracts will give certainty and run for ten years from this spring.

What this renewed GMS should deliver is a forward-looking contract which embeds genomic technology into standard clinical pathways and, in-turn, makes a positive impact on diagnosis delays.

Last year also saw the establishment of pilot clinics for people with undiagnosed rare diseases that bring many more services ‘under one roof’.

Two of these pilot centres – one in the north and one in the south of England – are expected to be operational by autumn 2026. Their purpose is simple but should make a big difference; to give people who have exhausted standard lines of diagnosis a new path to understanding what’s wrong. This brings vital hope.

Coordination of care remains a longstanding challenge for people with rare conditions, for whom the term comorbidity was coined. This requires input from a range of specialists and can be very challenging for a health system such as the NHS.

To answer this, NHS England is looking at models of care that support rare disease collaborative networks (28 of which now exist) to join things up and bring that consistency across services.

Another significant advance is the work being done on so-called ‘novel’ therapies.

Regulators like the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency have made commitments to change how rare therapies are treated, with a view to facilitating more timely access to the latest treatments.

These are the sorts of advances that not only push scientific boundaries, but also give real hope to individuals and families living with rare conditions. We need to see, soon, the first patient treated by one of these therapies to keep momentum in this space.

Of course, none of this has happened by accident. Central to the 2026 Action Plan’s development and delivery has been the voice of the rare disease community.

I launched the ‘National conversation on rare diseases’ in 2019 which gathered over 6,000 responses across the UK and directly informed the four priorities being settled upon.

This time, patient organisations, clinical experts and charities seem to have again provided insight, and lived experience, ensuring the new plan lands with the credibility it must have to be successful.

I have tried to be positive in this piece – and there is much to be positive about – but we shouldn’t fool ourselves there isn’t a LOT of work to be done.

Today, only around 5 % of rare conditions have an approved and effective treatment, and for too many people the journey towards diagnosis is more long wandering road than ‘odyssey’ which suggests an adventure eventually leading somewhere good.

This plan isn’t the endpoint – and it’s not meant to be. It is the next part of a long-term commitment which builds on the work I did, which in itself built on the 2013 UK Strategy for Rare Diseases.

Credit to the current team of health ministers, across the UK, who have agreed to further extend that work giving us further chances to address unmet need and prepare for the future.

As someone who has seen both the frustrations and the progress in this policy area over many years, I welcome the clarity, ambition and practical focus of the 2026 Action Plan.

At a time when Ministers in this government are (rightly) criticised for producing grand plans without much of a nod to implementation, it is refreshing indeed.

Trump’s Maritime Strategy Opens New Waters for U.S. Shipbuilding Industry

By Erin Caddell, Anchor Advisors, in partnership with GK Strategy

A recently announced Trump Administration plan for the U.S. maritime industry is likely to open new opportunities for U.S.-focussed companies, investors, training businesses and even real-estate developers interested in reigniting the domestic shipbuilding industry and its related value chain – while presenting commensurate challenges in invigorating an industry that has been forsaken in favor of foreign competitors for decades.

Entitled “America’s Maritime Action Plan”, the proposal released last month responds to a long-held but still shocking fact: that despite boasting the world’s largest economy, a long history of engineering and technological innovation at sea, and over 150,000 kilometers (95,000 miles) of shoreline, less than 1% of the world’s ships are built in the U.S.

It was not always so. U.S. shipbuilding was key to Allied success in both world wars. The U.S. remained the world’s largest shipbuilder as late as 1975, according to the U.S. Trade Representative. The decline of domestic shipbuilding echoes that of many American manufacturing sectors in the post-World War II era, with foreign countries using cost advantages in labor and materials to siphon away an industry once dominated by American companies. Today, 74% of the world’s commercial ships, 80% of ship-to-shore cranes and 96% of shipping containers are built in China, according to the White House. U.S. reliance on foreign shipping presents a national-security risk commonly cited by Republicans and Democrats as rivalry between China and the U.S. has intensified.

The Maritime Action Plan was set in motion by an executive order signed by President Trump in April 2025 and attempts to address this imbalance. It focuses on four pillars: 1) Rebuild domestic shipbuilding capacity; 2) Reform maritime workforce education and training; 3) Protect the maritime industrial base; and 4) Enhance national security, industrial security, and industrial resilience.

The Action Plan also recommends establishing Maritime Prosperity Zones (MPZs) would be modeled on the Opportunity Zones (OpZones) included in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), the tax bill passed by Trump Administration and the Republican-controlled Congress in 2017. OpZones are census tracts designated as economically distressed areas where investors can receive tax benefits for long-term investments. OpZones were made permanent and the tax incentives expanded further in federal legislation passed in July 2025. The Action Plan recommends establishing 100 MPZs, ensuring these areas are geographically diverse and include regions outside traditional coastal shipbuilding centers.

What does this mean for companies and investors? Like many government white papers, the Maritime Action Plan is loaded with recommendations and big ideas, many of which are unlikely to become reality. And the plan acknowledges that a number of its initiatives would require Congressional legislation (see below), many with funding required – not an easy task given partisan rancor in Washington, D.C, and high U.S. budget deficits. Nonetheless, the plan touches a nerve as both U.S. political parties have grown more concerned in recent years about reliance on China in a number of industries from pharmaceuticals to rare earths to solar panels. We do see the Trump Administration continuing its focus on domestic shipbuilding given its focus on reshoring American manufacturing activity and reducing dependence on foreign partners for critical infrastructure. Democrats would likely support many of the work streams outlined in the Action Plan as well, especially as the investments outlined would help both red and blue states (many U.S. shipyards are heavily staffed by union workers, a traditional Democrat constituency). A contact who attended a recent annual U.S. shipbuilding conference reported that attendance was double or more the year before, with discussions dominated by the Administration’s new maritime strategy.

Revitalizing the domestic shipbuilding industry and its related labor and supply chains will take years. But in the interim, other opportunities may well present themselves to maritime operators and their owners: domestically made and operated software to track ships; the aforementioned Maritime Prosperity Zones; and revitalized maritime education and training programs, just to name a few. In a fractious Washington – one in which control of the seas have come rapidly to the fore again through the recently U.S.-initiated conflict in the Gulf – the U.S. domestic maritime industry may well set sail.

Want to learn more? Reach out to GK’s U.S. partner Erin Caddell at e.caddell@anchor-advisors.net.

From Policy to Production: The EU’s Industrial Accelerator Act

The journey was long and the debates fierce. While the European Commission had initially scheduled its official presentation for November 25, 2025, it was only on March 4, 2026, that the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) was finally unveiled.

Justified by the imperative of economic security, this initiative marks a major turning point in the Union’s economic strategy. It aims to strengthen supply chain resilience while safeguarding the continent’s industrial capacity.

First mentioned in the Clean Industrial Deal under the name Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act, the text was intended to stimulate demand for clean European products by introducing sustainability, resilience, and European preference criteria into both public and private tenders.

Although the final regulation has dropped the “decarbonisation” label, it retains its core essence. The Commission has set an ambitious sovereignty target: to increase the share of manufacturing industry to 20% of European GDP by 2035.

However, this text is the result of a laborious compromise. In the face of reluctance from certain Member States and internal tensions between several Directorates-General, some flagship measures had to be substantially reworked before reaching this final version.

Streamlining Industrial Procedures

Several measures within the IAA aim to facilitate and strengthen the deployment of industrial manufacturing capacities.

Facilitating Permit-Granting Procedures

This applies specifically to permit-granting procedures for industrial manufacturing and decarbonisation projects. Member States are required to establish a single application procedure, grouping all necessary permits within one application, accessible through a single access point.

A designated competent authority, responsible for coordinating the process, has 45 days to either acknowledge the application as complete or request any missing information. At the same time, all energy-intensive industry decarbonisation projects benefit from preferential treatment: they must be able to rely on the accelerated procedures provided for by the NZIA (Net-Zero Industry Act), as well as the environmental assessment streamlining measures proposed by the Commission in February.

Creation of Industrial Manufacturing Acceleration Areas

The regulation also mandates each Member State to designate industrial manufacturing acceleration areas on its territory.

Designed as true clusters of “industrial symbiosis,” these areas must provide a reinforced competitiveness framework. This includes the streamlining of procedures and the pooling of infrastructure, as well as access to financing, support for research and innovation, and the provision of a skilled workforce.

These areas are intended to prioritize manufacturing sites for sectors identified as strategic, namely:

  • Certain energy-intensive industries: manufacture of paper, coke and refined petroleum products, chemicals, rubber and plastic products, other non-metallic minerals, and basic metals;
  • The automotive industry: manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers;
  • Net-zero technologies identified in the NZIA (notably batteries, solar PV, and hydrogen).

Developing Demand for Clean European Products

One of the primary objectives of the IAA is to foster the emergence of lead markets for certain products in strategic sectors by imposing European origin requirements, low-carbon intensity criteria, or a combination of both.

An Outward-Looking European Preference

Arguably the most sensitive point of the text, the Commission’s proposal outlines, for the first time, the contours of a European preference (outside the field of defense). The IAA thus conditions access to certain public procurement contracts or public support schemes on compliance with a European origin criterion for the products supplied.

Regarding industrial production, only a few specific products are targeted:

  • Concrete and mortar, as well as any product whose performance depends mainly on these materials (including clinker and cement), intended for buildings and infrastructure. The required share of European origin is set at 5%.
  • Aluminium, and products whose performance depends mainly on it, used in buildings, infrastructure, and the automotive sector. The European origin threshold here is 25%.

For the automotive sector, the origin criterion applies only to pure electric vehicles (PEV), off-vehicle charging hybrid electric vehicles (OVC-HEV), and fuel-cell electric vehicles (FCEV) that are purchased, leased, rented or hire-purchased.

To satisfy this criterion, several conditions are set, such as final assembly within the Union, the integration of at least three main specific battery components originating in the EU, or a ratio where the total ex-works price of vehicle components (excluding the battery) originating in the Union represents at least 70% of the total ex-works price of all components. Specific conditions are also provided for small electric vehicles in the new M1E category, introduced during the automotive package of December 2025.

However, far from Chinese-style protectionism or the “Buy American Act,” this European version represents a middle ground between the need for protection expressed by part of European industry and the commitment of certain Member States to international trade.

This balance relies on several limitations, whether in the scope of public procurement and public support schemes affected by this European preference (see Articles 11 and 12), or in the actual location of the production country.

Indeed, Articles 8 and 9 specify that content originating from partner third countries (signatories of a free trade or customs union agreement, or parties to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement) is deemed to be of Union origin.

Introduction of Low-Carbon Content Requirements

The IAA also imposes carbon emission requirements for certain products supplied in the context of public procurement or projects benefiting from public support. These requirements target concrete, mortar, and aluminium under the same conditions as the European origin criterion, but also include steel. Indeed, the proposed regulation stipulates that at least 25% of steel (as well as any product whose performance depends mainly on this material) intended for buildings, infrastructure, and motor vehicles, must meet low-carbon criteria.

The framework for assessing this low-carbon character varies depending on the nature of the products:

  • For construction products: it will be determined based on harmonised technical specifications or European Technical Assessments (ETA) adopted under the Construction Products Regulation (CPR).
  • For other products: the assessment will be based on the ecodesign requirements set by the ESPR (Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation).

Enhanced Screening of Foreign Direct Investment

While remaining open to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the EU is establishing – via the IAA – a stricter framework for large-scale projects in strategic sectors (batteries, electric vehicles, photovoltaics, and critical raw materials).

From now on, any investment exceeding €100 million in a sector where a single third country controls more than 40% of global manufacturing capacity is subject to explicit approval. This decision falls either under a competent national authority, which each Member State is required to designate, or directly under the European Commission.

To be granted the authorization, the investment must satisfy at least four of the six compliance criteria established by the regulation. These criteria concern:

  • The degree of control exercised by the foreign investor over the European entity;
  • Guarantees for the protection of intellectual property;
  • The share of research and development expenditure localized in Europe;
  • The proportion of the workforce employed within the Union;
  • The level of sourcing of inputs of European origin.

If you would like to discuss the impact of the EU’s Industrial Accelerator Act in more detail, please do get in touch with the GK team or our European partner, Euros / Agency.